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The Indian Merchants' Chamber.

"THE RECLUSE."31. MURZBAN ROA^T. FORT.

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From

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Secretary, Indian Merchants' Chamber.

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

Department of Commerce, NEW DELHI.

Sir,

In Continuation of my letter to you dated 9th September, 1932, and, as mentioned therin, I am now directed by my Committee to address you on the Report of the Indian delegation to the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa, and with reference to the Trade Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India.

2. My Committee desire, first of all, to emphasise that India's participation in the Ottawa Conference was imposed on her from outside. The people of India were not consulted about the advisability of holding, or participating in, such a Conference, and the fact that the Government of India had agreed to send a delegation, and also had nominated

-1-



delegates to that Conference was made known almost accidentally in reply to a question in the Assembly, on the 4th April last. It cannot, therefore, be said that the nominees of the Government of India, who attended the Conference, spoke on behalf of India, or that India willingly participated in the deliberations of that Conference.

3. My Committee have examined the Report, and can only reiterate their condemnation of the Agreement entered into. Indeed, from an examination of the arguments and the statistics contained in the Report, they feel more convinced than ever that the Agreement is not only not to the benefit of India, but is positively prejudicial to her economic interests. The attitude of the Government of India, in the past, on various occasions when the question of Imperial Preference came up, is well known, and has been well recognised by the Delegation themselves. It was that India had little to gain by the adoption of a general scheme of tariff preferences within the Empire, and that on the balance there were no sufficient grounds why India should support any such scheme. In spite of that attitude, which they consistently maintained till 1927, when granting protection to India's Steel industry the principle of Imperial Preference was introduced by the back-door, in the teeth of the opposition of the elected members of the Legislative Assembly.

The same was done in the case of the Cotton Textile industry in 1930, when the plight of that industry was taken advantage of to extend the principle of Imperial Preference. It is inconceivable how it can be held that there was no preference to Britain involved in the differential duties then imposed. It is also inconceivable to my Committee how the preference given could have possibly been in the interests of India, as contended by the Delegation. The Delegation themselves recognise that, if not in intent, in fact, at any rate, those duties did involve the grant of preference to Britain. And they also recognise that the duties did confer advantages on Britain. But as far as this country is concerned, it received no equivalent and compensatory benefit.

4. Having thus departed from a policy consistently maintained since Lord Curzon's time, the Delegation have now thrown it completely over, on the ground that a new situation had arisen following the Import Duties Act, and the subsequent announcement of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in this behalf. That new situation was the imposition by the United Kingdom of a general 10 per cent. duty from which India would be exempted, if she agreed to give preference to Britain. In the words of the delegation, "It was no longer a question of what India stood to gain, but what she stood to lose," if she did not give such preference--a point of view which my Committee

consider untenable.

5. The Delegation emphasise that the paramount consideration to be borne in mind was, of course, the interests of India's export trade; but my Committee fail to see that they have even considered these interests. They cannot help pointing out that the issues involved in the Ottawa Conference, so far as India was concerned, did not receive the dispassionate consideration due, and the Delegation were throughout obsessed by the fear that, if India did not join in such a scheme of preference, her export trade to the United Kingdom would inevitably shrink and suffer. The Government of India themselves cannot be denied that it was their clear intention to give preference to Britain, following the preference already given to her in Steel and Textiles. Nowhere in the Report, for instance, the slightest consideration seems to have been given to the serious probability of the loss to India's export trade with foreign countries, which is nearly three times as much as that with the United Kingdom. Nowhere has there been any consideration of India's export trade as a whole. In the case of almost all foreign countries India exports to each one of them far more than what she imports from it. And Lord Curzon's Government, 30, years ago, was wise in refusing to consider any concession of tariff preferences, which might "involve reprisals by foreign nations." In estimating the balance of advantages, however, the Delegation did not even consider the possibility of such reprisals and their effects on

India's export trade.

6. It has been argued that the interests of the Indian agriculturist demand the grant of preference to Britain lest his exports to British markets diminish. So grave a concern for him should have merited at least some examination of the probable effects of the Agreement on his exports to other countries which, we need not repeat, are of far greater moment to him. The Delegation have paid not the slightest attention to those his more vital interests, in the rest of his markets which absorb 64 per cent of his produce as against 22 per cent taken by Britain. To say, therefore, that the Delegation have acted in his interests is but a travesty of facts.

7. The most amazing part of the Report is that in which an attempt is made to show that by keeping certain articles on the free list the United Kingdom is conferring a boon on India, and that the Delegation have achieved some unfeigned gain for India by persuading the British delegation to do so. The Delegation admit that in the case of these articles, in which India possesses what amounts to a practical monopoly in the British market, a preference is "nugatory". They enumerate articles, like Raw Jute, Lac, Myrabolams, Broken Rice, Mica and certain varieties of Hemp, in which India enjoys such a monopoly. In spite of this, they make a laboured apologia to lead the public to believe that India has been favoured by the United Kingdom

by keeping on the free list thest raw materials of British industry.

8. Then again, the considoration of the Delegation has been most superficial and one-sided, on the effects of India's non-participation in the scheme on her export trade to the United Kingdom. The largest items in this trade are, Tea, Jute, Hides and Skins, Raw Cotton and Oil-seeds. My Committee consider that the risk which weighed in the minds of the Delegation, in the case of Tea, was most exaggerated. After all, India is the lar supplier of Tea to the United Kingdom, and the ability of Ceylon to supplant India in the United Kingdom market is limited. An import duty on such a necessity of life inevitably falls on the consumer. So much has been said of the instance of Tea that it calls for a little fuller examination. India exports to the United King Rs. 22 crores of Tea. Ceylon, the next largest supplier, exports 18 crores. Now, if Ceylon got preference, and we did not, it could under-sell us in the British markets provided, of course, it were capable of totally supplanting Indian exports. But it is obvious that Ceylon cannot more than double its output. It is conceivable that it might increase its production by 4 or 5 crores, in which case, the figures of Indian and Ceylonese exports would be just reversed. But assuming that Ceylon were in a position to supply 22 crores Britain would still require 18 crores and would have to come to India for it, the supply from the Dutch Indies being comparatively small. A duty of 10 per cent against Indian Tea, 18

ores of which is wanted by Britain can only result in raising the price of all Tea imported into Britain. In that case, Ceylon would no doubt have the benefit of that higher price. All the same, the person who would be hit most would be not the grower in India but the consumer in Britain. Besides, as the Delegation themselves say, "when the preference is accorded to several countries a large proportion of its requirements, the preference cannot do much to extend the market for the produce of any of the countries concerned."

9. It ought to have been obvious, therefore, that no Government in England would ever impose any higher duty on Tea, which would be a burden on the British consumer. One might assuredly hope also that the ~~interests~~ of the British Tea Planter in India would equally weigh with the British Government before they took any such action against them. And in guarding their interests, those of the Indian Tea Labourer would ipso facto be taken care of. My Committee would be much surprised if an article produced by the British planter in India and consumed by a large majority of the population of the United Kingdom could at any time become subject to much increased or heavier duties, even if India had not entertained the Agreement. It may be noted in this connection that there are, in British politics, very important interests who are seriously opposed to any further levy which would

add to the cost of living.

10. In the case of Jute, India's monopoly as a producer is, of course, recognised. In the case of Jute manufactures, a duty of 10 per cent against the Indian product would have hurt the British manufacturer in India, and it is, therefore, doubtful if the British delegation would have carried out the threat in this class of goods too. Even if they did, it would have affected no more than 6 per cent. Of our total export of Jute manufactures 94 per cent of which go to foreign countries.

11. In the case of Cotton, it may be noted that a duty on foreign cotton imported into the United Kingdom was suggested by the Indian Delegation; but the British delegation made it plain that they could not entertain such a proposal at all. The only article of importance in which an additional market could be given to us by the United Kingdom is Rew Cotton. But a preference in favour of Indian Cotton is flatly denied. A pious hope is held out that arrangements will be made to encourage the export to Lancashire of Indian Cotton - improved type, and the Delegation are more than satisfied with this hope. They forget, however, that in spite of the efforts of many decades, the kind of cotton required by Lancashire has not been produced in India in sufficient quantities. They forget also the fact that, even if we grew some more of the improved variety in future, even if we grew some more of the improved variety in future, the Indian mills would be its first buyers, because they are now importing such cotton. The day when the Indian grower is in a

position to supply an exportable surplus of such variety, over and above the increasing requirements of the Indian mills, is remote. And a little thought would have saved the Delegation from falling, and from leading the public, into the erroneous belief that there was any advantage to India in such a hope. Cotton was the only article in which the British delegation could have shown their bona fides for the benefit of the Indian export trade. It was the only article in which the Indian Delegation could have justly insisted on a clear preference. A scheme of preference, in which there is every likelihood of Indian exports of raw cotton to Japan and other countries being reduced, and in which there is no possibility of a corresponding increase in England's demand for the article, must obviously be detrimental to the interests of the Indian grower. Attempts have been made in the past by Britain to develop the growth of suitable cotton, in other parts of the Empire, by means of subsidies. If this be an indication of the direction of the co-operation of His Majesty's Government in developing the growth of cotton, then India has little to expect from Article 8 of the Agreement.

12. The Delegation, indeed, admit that "the importing country has always to consider the interests of its own manufacturers, and must naturally be reluctant to impose duties, which would increase their cost, more particularly when the finished products of industry are ultimately exported to foreign countries." The bulk of our exports to the United Kingdom consists of raw material for British export industries. And that

Being the case, they should have realised that India had nothing to fear from the operation of the Import Duties Act. The very interests of British industry would have dictated to His Majesty's Government the inadvisability of doing anything to increase its cost of production by the imposition of such duties. For, an import duty on essential raw material must inevitably fall on the manufacturer who uses it, and to that extent his ability to compete in foreign markets must diminish. It should, moreover, have been obvious that most of India's exports to the United Kingdom are such as cannot be so easily replaced from other sources. The preference accorded to India by the United Kingdom on such articles is, therefore, sham and illusory. In fact, having regard to the very nature of our exports, it would be difficult to show how any material preference could be given by the United Kingdom, which would be of value to India. And even assuming that there was a possibility of a part of our export trade to the United Kingdom, in some or other of the less important commodities, being diverted on our non-participation in the scheme, the loss would be nothing compared with the loss that, under our participation in the scheme, we shall be faced with in our export trade with the rest of the world. The inevitable increase of imports into India from the United Kingdom, resulting from such a scheme of preference, must appreciably reduce imports from foreign countries, which, in their turn, will be compelled to buy less from India. And when it is remembered that India sells far more to them than to Britain, the serious effect of Imperial Preference on India's export trade can well be imagined.

13. The tariff weapon is admittedly being used by the British Government as a bargaining instrument to obtain certain advantages for British goods in the Empire markets. The Indian Delegation are apparently satisfied that they have struck a good bargain for India. My Committee are, however, of the opinion that the Delegation were so overpowered by the fear of the danger to Indian exports to the United Kingdom, that they overlooked the importance of India's position in international trade in general, and in the trade with the United Kingdom in particular. They do not seem to have been aware even of the most elementary facts of the situation, that, on the one hand, Indian exports to the United Kingdom are mostly articles of food and drink, or raw materials required for British industry, most of which are difficult to be replaced; and, on the other, that the Indian market is the most important single market for British goods, and that the need for the retention and expansion of this market on behalf of the British manufacturers, under present conditions, is greater than ever. Had the Delegation appreciated these elementary facts, they would have realised that India was in a much stronger position than other parts of the Empire; for, as Britain's largest single market, she was in a position to offer substantial advantages and, therefore, to dictate terms, instead of being dictated to under fear of imaginary losses. Had they taken this into account, they would have come to the conclusion that by the acceptance of the Agreement the gain of the United Kingdom was going to be preponderating and at the expense of India, and that by the non-acceptance of the Agreement the loss of the United Kingdom

would have been far greater than that of India. Had these fundamental facts been borne in mind, and had they adopted the very method of the British Delegation, and used the same threats in the bargaining, the situation would have been entirely different. In answer to Britain's threat of penalising Indian goods, the delegation could have, with equal justification, threatened to withdraw the advantage already given in Steel and Textiles. That such a natural attitude would have gone home to the British Delegation may be realised from the fact that they were fully conscious of the substantial advantages which Britain was receiving by these already existing preferences.

In para 100 of the Report, the Delegation observe: "It cannot be assumed that if there had been no differential duties, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would have been prepared to enter into the Agreement actually concluded or that they would be prepared to continue the Agreement indefinitely if the differential duties were abolished." This means that without any further gifts on our part, the British threat would have been silenced, and the fear of loss of India's trade in the United Kingdom, which is the basis of the Agreement and the Report, would have altogether disappeared. A most valuable instrument of bargaining was thrown away.

14. Even taking the Agreement as it is, my Committee consider that the Delegation, in their Report, give an entirely misleading impression to the public regarding the advantages which either country may expect. In the first place, they calculate, omitting the most important commodities that are imported from the United Kingdom on which

preference is already being given, viz., Steel and textiles, that India will be called upon to give preference to Britain only on £17.4 million of British goods, and that, on the other hand, India stands to receive preference in Britain on goods of the value of £41.8 million. If, however, the excluded items are taken into account, which come to £ 26.6 millions, the Delegation say that the balance is fairly even, which means that the value of trade of either country likely to receive preference is about the same. Even so, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer stated only the other day in the House of Commons that India had given preference on as much as 26 per cent of her total imports; and since the Delegation have been working on the figures for 1929-30, the percentage works out at £46.8 million of goods on which we are to give preference to Britain, as against £44 million (£17.4 + 26.6) estimated by the Delegation. The difference, is, however, small and we shall leave it aside. But why need they have at all presented such misleading data, and suggested that we would be called upon to give preference to Britain only on £17.4 million of our imports? And why should they have excluded, from imports into India, Steel and Cotton goods, on the ground that we had already given them preference, when they do not exclude from the imports into Britain, Indian Tea which has also been receiving preference for several years now, irrespective of the recent Import Duties Act? If articles on which preference is already granted are to be excluded in striking a balance, surely they must be excluded in both the cases. Moreover, they themselves admit that the fairness of the Agreement cannot be measured by this "crude test." In the words

of the Report, "the only test by which the value of a trade Agreement can be judged is the extent to which it results in an increase in the export trade of the countries concerned or in the retention of trade which would otherwise have been diminished or altogether lost." While unnecessarily dilating on several irrelevant and minor issues, they have taken no trouble whatsoever to apply to the Agreement this "only" and real test, and to work out an estimate of the gain or loss to India on such a test.

15. In fairness to the Indian public, the Delegation should have made some attempt to estimate the probable increase or decrease in the trade of either country, with reasons in the case of each articles. My Committee have searched in vain for such an estimate in the Report. They therefore cannot accept the mere assertion that India has gained "solid and substantial advantages", and that, "what she has given can be given without detriment to any national interest"; because if we were to apply to the available data of 1929-30, the year which the Delegation has adopted as the basis of their estimates, the very test enunciated by them, my Committee are convinced that the conclusion would be wholly contrary to that assumed by the Delegation.

16. The value of a trade agreement can only be assessed on the basis of anticipated gain. In assessing, therefore, the value of the Agreement with the United Kingdom, one must needs estimate the probable gain in the export trade of either country, if the Agreement is to be accepted, and the probable loss in the case of non-acceptance. From the very nature of the case, there can, of course, be no finality or

DEF. DCC. #1835

exactness in such an estimate. But an estimate based on available data applied with due regard to known economic tendencies, is better than no estimate at all. A Finance Member who makes his estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the coming year, particularly with reference to new taxation, is on similar grounds and it is all he can do to make them as reasonable as possible with due regard to economic considerations. In the present case, there can be only one method of estimating. By taking the total imports into India from all countries of the various classes of articles affected by the Agreement and by deducting from them the same classes of imports from the United Kingdom, the maximum margin which the United Kingdom can hope to capture in the Indian market is arrived at. It is obvious, however, that it cannot capture the whole of that margin even with the help of a preferential duty save, perhaps, in exceptional cases. What we have therefore to estimate is its probable capacity to capture a part of this margin. And in this, numerous factors enter into calculation. Each class of articles must be examined on its own merits and on known tendencies. Further, we must take into account also the factor of protection to the indigenous industry, of competition from other countries and the capacity for expansion of the industry concerned. My Committee consider that having regard to all these factors, the most that the United Kingdom can hope to do, in most of the classes is to capture about 50

DEF. DOC. #1835

per cent of the possible margin. The total possible margin to the United Kingdom in the imports into India of articles which are to receive preference is about 75 crores, and since in some of the classes less than 50 per cent of the margin might be captured, it would be reasonable to estimate that it would capture, say, about Rs. 30 crores of new trade in India.

17. Similarly, the additional market that India may capture in the United Kingdom can be estimated, due regard being paid to the nature of Indian exports, and the other factors referred to above. My Committee estimate that by the preference offered to Indian goods in the British market, the additional trade that we may have in that market is hardly likely to exceed Rs. 15 crores, most of which will be diversion from our present trade with other countries, whose capacity to buy from us will be reduced on our buying less from them and more from Britain, as a consequence of the preference that British goods will receive in India.

18. While Britain therefore stands to lose 30 crores of additional trade if the Agreement is not accepted, we stand to lose little because, in the event of acceptance, the additional trade that we might expect with the United Kingdom would not be new trade, but only a diversion from our existing trade with other countries. In the event of non-acceptance, Britain has, of course, threatened to impose a 10 per cent duty against

DEF. DOC. #1835

some of our goods. My Committee have estimated that having regard again to the nature of India's exports to the United Kingdom, the shrinkage in the British market due to the duty will be no more than 10 to 25 per cent, according to the nature of the articles. In this connection, we take into account the articles in which India is the chief supplier to the United Kingdom; those in which the Dominions or the Colonies are likely to compete; those in which our capacity to export is limited; and certain special articles like linsedd, pig iron and cotton. Taking all these factors into account, in the event of non-acceptance of the Agreement, we would stand to lose at the most Rs. 10 crores worth of export trade to the United Kingdom, for which we shall have to find other markets. But since in this case we would not be giving any preference to Britain, there should be no difficulty in our foreign markets absorbing these exports - a bare 25 per cent of our total exports. And it must be remembered again that between them, foreign countries buy far more from us than Britain or the Empire.

19. On these estimates a balance can be struck. And it will be found that if the Agreement is accepted, while Britain stands to gain far more than we do, we stand to lose little if the Agreement is not accepted. And this balance does not take into account the harm that would befall indigenous industries in India by the grant of preference to Britain, and the amount of additional taxation that would be involved in putting the Agreement into effect, which harm and which

DEF. OC. #1835

additional taxation we should be spared, were we to reject the Agreement.

20. My Committee would like to point out that if the increase of British imports into India is estimated at any lower figure, the amount of higher taxation which India will have to pay on foreign imports will be greater; and if the estimate of such imports is higher, the reciprocal advantage to India in the British market should be correspondingly larger. In other words, if British imports into India increase, the Customs revenue suffers because of the preference and to the extent of the increase and the decline would have to be made good by fresh taxation. If they do not increase to the anticipated extent and foreign goods still continue to be imported, the higher duty against them means so much more in direct taxation on the people. But in the former alternative, in increasing Britain's advantages in the Indian market, India can justly claim equal and reciprocal advantages in the British market. In view of the estimates given above, my Committee feel that, on the one hand, the advantage to India in the British there is bound to be substantial addition to taxation in order to give effect to the Agreement,--which means that in either case the sacrifice of India is great.

21. But even this statement of account is incomplete, when we consider the important fact that the Agreement would

be not only between India and Great Britain, but also with the Colonial Empire. For want of time at Ottawa, no agreements have been concluded by the Delegation with the Dominions, and though discussions were carried on further, negotiations have been left to the Government of India. In the case of the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, which are covered by the Agreement with His Majesty's Government, no reciprocity is offered, because, whereas a few minor colonies will be invited and are expected to give preference to Indian goods, under certain conditions, the more important colonies like Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyka, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, part of Northern Rhodesia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and the Mandated Territories will not give any because of their international agreements. In spite of this fact, India is required, and the Delegation have accepted the position, to give preference to goods coming from all these Colonies. Besides, no assessment of the value of the trade coming from these Colonies has been made or is possible. The Delegation admit that no Trade Returns are available relating to most of them; and, therefore, there are "insuperable difficulties" in making any estimate. At the same time, some of these Colonies do a large entrepot trade; and there are bound to be, therefore, serious administrative difficulties in ascertaining whether particular articles really originate from the Colonies in question. As to how the Delegation could have signed an agreement, which gives away valuable privileges in the Indian market to such a large number of Colonies, without obtaining from them at the same time anything in return worth the mention, passes

comprehension.

22. Even confining ourselves to the rest of the Colonial Empire, i. e. excluding the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories which are barred from giving us preference, the Delegation, first of all, admit that they were unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain preference for Indian and Burmese rice which has to meet with keen competition in Eastern markets from rice produced in other Asiatic countries. Ceylon and Malaya, in fact, impose an import duty on rice. Fiji, which gives some preference to Empire goods, cannot give us any special preference, because we cannot give preference on its sugar, since sugar is a protected industry in India. Nor can Mauritius give us any preference unless we gave preference on its sugar, which we cannot. The West Indies, Sierra Leone, Gabibia, Somaliland, Gibraltar and Cyprus give a preference on Empire products. But the Delegation themselves find that the only Indian exports of substantial importance are Jute manufacture and rice to the West Indies, to an annual value of about Rs. 40 lacs. Hongkong is only a port, with no hinterland, and its trade is mainly an entrepot trade, and it is therefore not in a position to give any preference to any part of the Empire. In the case of Malaya, the Delegation admit that we shall have to give more than we receive. And even taking the Colonial Empire as a whole, they haltingly admit that India will "probably be found to be giving preferences on goods of a somewhat higher value than that of the goods on which she receives preferences from the

REF. DOC. #1835

"Colonial Empire"; and that we must trust to the growth of our exports of manufactures to "redress any adverse balance", Do the Delegation seriously hold that we shall increase our manufactures, when the whole scheme of preference is devised to increase the imports of British manufactures into India?

23. If the estimate made above regarding the diversion of Indian trade to the United Kingdom be considered, along with the obviously one-sided nature of the Agreement with the Colonial Empire, the conclusion is only strengthened that taking the Agreement as a whole, it is calculated to give far more than to receive.

24. My Committee must draw attention to another aspect of this matter. It is a tragic irony that we are called upon to give preference to Colonies in which the treatment meted out to Indians leaves much to be desired, and which has been one of the sorest grievances of India for years past against the Colonial Office. Where the citizens of India are denied the bare rights of citizenship in a Colony or Dominion, it is a travesty of justice, to suggest that raw materials or manufactured articles from that Colony or Dominion should have preferential consideration in India. It is an acknowledged convention of commercial treaties and arrangements that the contracting parties give each other's citizens mutual rights to enter, travel and reside in each other's territories, and to possess property

DEF. DOC. #1835

and do not subject them to any special taxes or charges.

There are Colonies in the British Empire which not only do not give Indian citizens such elementary rights but in fact impose on them the further hardship of discriminatory legislation, and we are now asked that we should give them preference without any undertaking on their part to give Indian citizens even such conventional rights. The Delegation cannot say that this point was not brought to their notice, as my Committee understand that the Chairman of the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association, sent telegram in the matter to the leader of the Delegation.

My Committee consider that in identifying themselves with the grant of preference to Colonies, which treat Indians with discrimination, the Government of India will seriously discount their advocacy of the rights of Indians in the Colonies and Dominions, --an advocacy which for a number of years recently has been to their credit. As long as this discrimination against Indians prevails in any Colony, and preference to the goods of such a Colony, can only be considered as an insult added to injury.

25. The Report is not only misleading as already pointed out, but has altogether ignored two most important aspects arising out of the Agreement, namely; the loss of Indian trade in other countries and the additional indirect taxation involved in putting the agreement into effect. We have already referred to the fact that there is not even a mention of India's trade

with other parts of the world, which, in the aggregate, is of far greater consequence to us. So far as the method of putting the Agreement into effect is concerned, it is obvious that it will require many changes in the tariff, leading to additional indirect taxation, which must be condemned unreservedly. If preference is given by a reduction of the existing import duty, the resulting gap in the Customs revenue will have to be made good by additional taxation. If it is given by an increase in the existing duty, that increase will be additional indirect taxation. So that, in either case, preference can only be given by increasing taxation, direct or indirect. There can be no justification for taxing the poor Indian citizen in order that British imports into India may increase.

26. My Committee doubt if any serious consideration has been given by the Delegation to the position and prospects of the several nascent industries of India which are thus to be face suddenly with the serious competition of British goods if they receive preference by a reduction in the existing duty. If an attempt is made to gauge the consequences on many indigenous industries that are just beginning to establish themselves, it will be found that, exposed to serious competition, most of them will be threatened with extinction. In representation of this kind it is, of course, impossible for my Committee to

go into the prospects of all such industries. They can but mention a few instances. Take the instance of the soap-making industry. With the growth of numerous soap works in India, imports of foreign soaps, during the last four years alone, have declined from about Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 28 lakhs. The value of the present output of these works is estimated at about Rs. 20 lakhs and the value of their productive capacity is estimated at about Rs. 52 lakhs. In other words, they are in a position to-day to more than double their output, and to replace the entire imports. The Agreement, however, will deal a serious blow to them; for a 10 per cent preference given to British soaps -- and even now more than 80 per cent of imported soaps come from Britain -- is assuredly calculated to drive the Indian manufacturer out of his own market. And instances of this kind in which grave harm will be done to Indian industries by the grant of preference to Britain can, indeed, be multiplied.

27. Take another kind of instance. The Agreement seeks to give a preference of 10 per cent to aluminium circles and sheets and manufactures imported into this country from Britain. There are a number of indigenous factories in India importing such circles and sheets and pressing them into utensils. At the same time, the large manufactures of

aluminium in Britain have also established utensil-making factories in this country. A preference of 10 per cent given to British aluminium circles and sheets must needs, therefore, drive the Indian manufacturer into the hands of the British aluminium interests. And since those interests themselves have their own factories in India, nothing will be easier for them than to starve the Indian manufacturer of supplies, and by extending their own factories, drive him out of his own market.

28. Apart from the important issues involved directly in the Agreement, there are fundamental questions of policy which the Agreement is likely to affect. For example, in spite of the way in which preference was given to British goods, while passing the Steel and Cotton Duties Acts, it has been assumed by the Delegation that these were a part and parcel of the fiscal policy of this country. This introduces a new question in the industrial policy of the country, namely, whether protection to Indian industries is to be given subject always to the dominating condition that the protective scheme itself shall contain preference for British goods, in those cases in which British manufactures are interested. My Committee need not point out that this would be in strange contrast to the policy of the Dominions, which

do not and will not give any preference to British goods in the case of those of their industries which, in their own interests, require protection even against Britain.

29. It may be pointed out that, unless a national economic policy is established in India and acknowledged and accepted by Government, the Agreement is contrary to national interests. A trade agreement should give maximum advantage for the products of a country and lead to increased manufacture, just as Britain seeks to do in her own case; and preferences should only be extended to such articles as are not manufactured in India or cannot be manufactured. It seems contrary to common sense, and to every consideration of economy, that Indian sheet bar should be exported to the United Kingdom and manufactured there into sheets, to be shipped back to India, when India could and should manufacture them herself. The industrial policy of India may thus be further adversely affected by the acceptance of the theory of industrial co-operation involved in the Supplementary Agreement. If this position is accepted, -- along with the change in the policy just referred to, -- India will be reduced to the position of manufacturing semi-finished goods; will be denied also the opportunity of extending domestic manu

domestic manufacture and employment; and the India taxpayer will be called upon to pay, so that the British manufacturer may have the benefit of turning these semi-finished goods into finished articles for the Indian market and thus help to relieve unemployment in Britain and, incidentally, give additional cargo virtually to British bottoms. In so far as the shipping industry is concerned, why, the whole scheme of preference will only strengthen the already dominant position of British Shipping in Indian waters, to the detriment of the growth of Indian Shipping.

30. The Delegation have omitted to consider also that, apart from actual tariff preference, British goods already receive substantial preference in this country in a variety of other ways. By administrative arrangements; by the fact of British investments in this country; by the manipulation of the currency policy of the country; and no less, by the introduction of the preferential method in the schemes of protection already in operation, British goods already receive preference in the Indian market, for which India does not get any adequate return. Indeed, Britain has always acted on the basis that India should be the producer of raw materials, and should be a free and open market for British goods. She has derived advantages in the past by the imposition of an excise duty in favour

of Lancashire. She has manipulated Indian currency and exchange to the advantage of British interests, and even now, to the serious disadvantage of India, free export of gold is allowed. Since Britain departed from the Gold Standard and the Rupee was compulsorily linked to Sterling at the Statutory Rate, British exports to India have secured preference of about 33 per cent over Gold Standard countries. This was in addition to the advantage of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent already conferred on them by the currency manipulation that raised the Statutory Rate from $1/4$ to $1/6$. On top of this, the Agreement proposes to give them a further additional advantage of 10 per cent; and this is what the Indian Delegation are pleased to call a substantial gain to India. Would it not have been fair and reasonable to have insisted on a quid pro quo for the advantages already secured by Britain through currency manipulation, before even entertaining the idea of this further sacrifice for the benefit of the British manufacture?

31. It has been laid down that in view of the impending constitutional changes, the Agreement is subject to six months' notice by either party, so that if the future Government of India want to denounce it, they can do so with ease. The difficulty of denouncing trade agreements is well known. Why, even His Majesty's Government have hesitated to denounce the Anglo-Japanese trade agreement, in spite of the plight of Lancashire on the one hand, and the India cotton-mill industry on the other. The clause in the Ottawa Agreement regarding six

months' notice has misled some people into the belief that the Agreement is not likely to do much harm because it will be possible to denounce it in due course. This, first of all, assumes that under the constitutional changes, India will attain the position of a self governing country, with powers to denounce such agreements, if she thinks fit. The manner in which Government are setting about getting together delegates for the Third Round Table Conference would not appear to warrant such hope being entertained, and it is generally apprehended that Government will force on India a Constitution which will, for all practical purposes, make the exercise of such power ineffectual. Even assuming that India will reach that stage two or three years to begin really to function. During the interval, new trade relations will have been formed, many channels of trade diverted, and the vested interests thus created will act as a powerful force against the denunciation of the Agreement. And all this time substantial damage would continue to be done to the country. My Committee would not have cared to mention this aspect but for the fact that the clause regarding six months' notice is likely to be mistaken by the public as a safeguard against the evils of the Agreement. It is idle to discuss seriously whether the Agreement is sound, or is in favour of India, or whether the notice clause makes it any the more

acceptable. One is almost led to the belief that the Agreement, in anticipation of the establishment of political reforms long promised and evaded, is intended to tie the hands and the free choice of the future Federal Assembly.

32. On economic grounds alone, the Agreement is so essentially unsound that my Committee are amazed that the Delegation did not unreservedly reject it. Whatever designation an economic arrangement between the Dominions and England might be given, it is altogether a misnomer to call any such arrangement between the United Kingdom and India an "Agreement". Can there really be a fair and a just agreement between a politically unequal and dependent country, and another which is its ruler? So long as there is no settlement of the political issues, so long as India is not self-governing, there can be no trade Agreement between the United Kingdom and India. For, only a free Legislature can freely make an agreement of this kind. And my Committee warn the Government that, if they get it passed through the present Assembly by means of the Official bloc and the nominated members and the Europeans, they will be laying the foundations, not of settlement between India and the United Kingdom, but of prolonged bitterness.

33. With regard to the manner, motive and method by which the Agreement was secured, my Committee will only say this: His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom held out a threat, and asked India to come to terms. The ~~representatives of India~~ ~~-- nominees of the Government of~~ India -- and their expert advisers, without caring to examine the nature of the threat acquiesced. They argued themselves into believing that it would hurt terribly, shutting their eyes to the possibility of their being hurt in the back much more, and by a number of stronger assailants, because of this very submission of theirs in agreeing to discriminate unequally against them; and ignoring, likewise, the consequences of Britain's position in the trade of India, made still more predominant, inevitably reducing India's trade with other countries, without giving any compensatory increase in our export trade with Britain.

34. In the whole history of trade relationship between Britain and India there has been no sorrier instance of the Trustees of the people of India coercing them in a course of action least consonant with their interests and manifestly in the interest of the Trustees themselves. In a word, it only means further economic domination. And any strengthening of the economic domination must needs result also

in increasing the political domination over this country.

35. Having achieved their object at Ottawa, it has now been proclaimed to the world that it is far from being a selfish one. It is altruistic. It is a gesture and an invitation to the world to reduce tariff barriers. Verily, an appropriate prelude to the World Economic Conference ! We are asked to believe that the only way to reduce such barriers is by putting up some more barriers ! And by implication, we are asked also to believe that it would be in India's interests to reduce her tariffs and give up her protectionist policy. Further, the Prime Minister has declared that with the Ottawa Agreements in their hands, His Majesty's Government have every intention of entering into trade agreements with the other nations of the world. If they succeed a general grant of preference will only negate even the nominal preference sought to be thrust on India.

36. To sum up, my Committee are of opinion that the situation created by the Agreement and the consequences thereof are as follows : --

- (1) The Agreement owes its origin not to India's needs or wishes, but to those of Britain. Having regard to the circumstances under which it has been made, and is sought to be carried into effect, it will be one forced upon an unwilling people, and is

therefore not likely to promote any cordial relations between the two countries, especially at the present juncture. - - -

- (2) The Agreement will perpetuate, and extend further the present dominant position of Britain in the trade of India. This is against the very economic axiom, that to be able to get the best advantage out of international trade, a country must needs have large trade relations with the largest possible number of countries as buyers and sellers, -- in other words, the widest possible markets and the widest possible sources of supply. Besides, the consequent strengthening of the economic domination of Britain will only serve to perpetuate and stiffen the political domination, in the further vested interests that it will create.
- (3) The Agreement is not based on the principle of reciprocity, because whereas the United Kingdom is likely to get a substantial benefit in the Indian market, India's advantage will be very little, if any, at all. The Delegation have failed to make effective use of the existing Indian in striking a bargain.

- (4) The Agreement ignores the principle of reciprocity altogether in the case of the Colonies, most of which are debarred from giving us any preference and to which nevertheless we are required to give preference. In the case of the remainder, we are asked to give more and receive less. Besides, agreements with the Dominions are yet to come.
- (5) The Agreement will reduce the purchasing power of other countries for our goods, because we shall get our imports in a much greater proportion from the United Kingdom, and there will thus be a substantial reduction in our imports from, and therefore in our exports to, other countries, which is not likely to be balanced by a proportionate increase in our exports to the United Kingdom. The Agreement wholly ignores this important factor.
- (6) The Agreement may lead to retaliation, active or passive, from foreign countries, the aggregate trade with which is of far more consequence to us than that with the United Kingdom.
- (7) The Agreement is bound to lead to additional indirect taxation, at a time when the people are already

overtaxed. Even if in future the finances of the Government of India improve, there will remain a large amount of this avoidable taxation on goods from other countries.

(8) The Agreement will seriously prejudice the growth of Indian industries in those articles in which British goods are to receive preference, and many a nascent industry will be driven out of our own home market. Even if an Indian industry in any of these articles, at any time in the future, proves its case for protection, protection will be given only on the basis of preference to British goods, as already done in the case of Steel and Textiles.

- (9) The Agreement initiates a policy of industrial co-operation between Britain and India, which will reduce India to the position of manufacturing semi-finished articles and the Indian taxpayer will be called upon to pay in order that the British manufacturer may have the benefit of turning such articles into finished products for the Indian market.
- (10) The Agreement in increasing British imports into India and diverting some of our exports to Britain, will only help to tighten the stranglehold of British

Shipping to the detriment of our own.

- (11) The alleged safeguard of power to denounce the Agreement on six months' notice is illusory.
- (12) The threatened loss of Indian trade in the British market by the imposition of a duty on certain Indian commodities, in the event of non-acceptance of the Agreement by India, is highly and unnecessarily exaggerated, because
- (a) the United Kingdom is not likely to impose additional duties on articles of food and drink or those which are required by her for manufacturing purposes;
 - (b) the United Kingdom is not likely to reduce imports from India, so long as she desires to increase her exports to us;
 - (c) the amount of trade which may be, if at all, in danger is so small that we shall be able to find other markets for the same, if necessary; and
 - (d) the difficulty of having to find such other markets is insignificant, compared with all the disadvantages enumerated above.

37. In conclusion, my Committee would like to emphasize that the Agreement should be judged as a whole in its manifold

consequences on the economic life and financial system of the country, because these are interconnected. The emphasis of the Delegation on only one single aspect, viz., the threatened loss of India's trade in the British market, gives an entirely wrong and warped perspective to the Agreement, and this must be deprecated as but a piece of propaganda, in favour of British industry under the guise of the so-called protection of the interests of the Indian farmer. For, the Agreement does not at all protect his interests; it is calculated only to divert the trade of India from other countries to the United Kingdom. In fact, the probable loss to him in the reduced demand for Indian raw materials from other countries will be greater than the threatened loss to him in the British market in case of non-acceptance of the Agreement. Judging the Agreement as a whole, my Committee have no hesitation in pronouncing their conviction that it is not in the interest of the Indian farmer, not in the interest of the Indian businessman, not in the interest of the Indian manufacturer, nor in the interest of the general taxpayer. It is only in the interest of the British manufacturer, the British exporter, and the British shipper. Truly, has the President of the Board of Trade in His Majesty's Government declared in the House of Commons that it will mean "an enormous increase in the activities of our houses exporting to India with

DEF. DOC. NO. 1835

a corresponding effect on manufacturing centres in the United Kingdom."

I beg to remain,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J.K. MEHTA,

Secretary.

印度商業會議所

「フォート、マーズパン」通 三一

「レクルース」

第一七六八號

一九三二年十一月二日

ボンペイ

印度商業會議所 理事

文學士「デュイ、ケイ、メータ」ヨリ

「ニューデリー」 印度政府

商務長宛

拝啓、一九三二年九月九日附貴殿宛手紙ニ讀キ同書面中ニセアル通り
今回餘ハ「オツタワ」ニ於ケル帝國經濟會議ノ印度代表ノ報告及ヒ聯
合王國政府印度政府間ノ貿易協定ニ關シテ貴殿宛オ話申上ダル様我ガ
委員會ヨリ指令ヲ受ケテキル
二、我ガ委員會ハ先づ第一ニ「オツタワ」會談ヘノ印度ノ參加ハ外部ヨ



リ課セラレタルモノナル事ヲ強調セント欲スルモノデアル。印度国民ハスカル會談ノ開催又ハ參加ノ可否ニ就キ相談ニ與ラナカツタノデアル。印度政府ガ代表ヲ送ル事ニ同意シ且ツ同會談ヘノ代表ヲ指名シタ事實ハ去ル四月四日、議會ニ於ケル質問ノ應答ニ於テ殆ンド遇然ニ發表セラレタノデアル。從ツテ同會談ニ出席セル印度政府ノ被任命者ハ印度ノ利益ヲ代表シテ語レルモノトモ又印度ガ同會談ノ審議ニ喜ンデ參加シタトモ云ヒ得トイワケデアル。

三、我々ノ委員會ハ該報告ヲ吟味シタガ締結サレタ右協定ニ對スル委員會トシテノ非難ヲ繰返シ得ルノミデアル。實際右報告書ニアル論議、統計ヲ吟味シ、委員會ハ該協定ガ單ニ印度ノ利益ニアラザルノミナラズ印度ノ經濟的利害關係ニ積極的ニ不利ナル事ヲ從來ニモ増シテ感ズルノデアル。印度政府ノ態度ハ、過去ニ於テ帝國特惠ノ問題ガ持チ上ツテ來ル諸々ノ機會ニ於テヨク知ラレテ居リ、代表團自身又之ヲヨク認識セル所デアル。當政府ノ態度ハ帝國內關稅特惠ノ一般計畫ノ採用ニヨリ印度ハ得ル所殆ンドナシト云フニアリ、又比

較較事スルニ印度ガスカル計費ヲ支持スペキ充分ナル理由ナシト云フニアツタノデアル。彼等ガ一貫シテ一九二七年マデ維持シタコノ態度ニモ拘ラズ、印度鐵工業ニ保護政策ガトラレルヤ選任セラレタル立法議院議員ニ反対ニモ拘ラズ帝國特惠ノ原理ガ内密ニ提出サレタノデアル。同ジ事ハ一九三〇年纖維工業ノ場合ニ於テ必爲サレコノ時ハ該工業ノ苦境ガ帝國特恵ノ原則擴大ノ爲ニ利用サレタノデアル。ソノ時課セラレタ差別稅中ニ英國ニ對スル特惠ガ全然含マレテキナカツタトハ如何ニシテ主張シ得ルノ方想像シ得ナイトコロデアル。又當時與ヘラレタ特恵ガ、代表團ニヨツテ主張サンタ如ク如何ニシテ印度ノ利益ニ合致シ得タデアラウカ、我々ノ委員會ニトツテ想像シ得ナイノデアル。代表團ハ彼等自身、假令故ラデハナイニシロ、事實ハ少クトモ、之等ノ關稅ハ英國メノ特惠ヲ包含セルモノナル事ヲ認メテキルノデアル。

彼等ハ又之等ノ關稅ガ英國ニ利益ヲ與ヘル事ヲ正ニ認メテキルノデアル。然シ當國ニ關スル限り、何等同等ナ又代償的利益ヲ享受シナ

カツタノデアル。

四 カクテ「カーラン」卿時代以來一貫シテ維持サレタ政策カラ離脱シテ代表團ハ今ヤ、輸入關稅條令及ビソレニ續ク聯合王國政府ノ之ニ關スル發表ノ結果新事態ガ發生シタト云フ理由ニ依リ之ヲ完全ニ拠棄シタノデアル。コノ新事態トハ、若シ印度ガ英國ニ特惠ヲ與ヘル事ニ同意スレバ免除サルベキ十バーセントノ關稅ノ聯合王國ニヨル賦課デアツタ。代表團ノ言葉ヲ借りテ言ヘバ、若シ印度ガカカル特惠ヲ與ヘナケレバ「印度ガ何ヲ獲ム爲ニ闘ツタカハ最早問題デハナクシテ何ヲ失フ爲ニ闘ツタカガ問題デアツタ」—コノ見解ハ我々ノ委員會ハ主張シ得ナイト考ヘテ居ル。

五 代表團ハ最モ留意スペキ事柄ハ勿論、印度ノ輸出貿易ノ利害關係デアルコトヲ強調シテキル。

然シ我ガ委員會ハ彼等ガ夫等ノ利害ヲ單ニ考慮ノ中ニ加ヘタモ考ヘルコトガ出來ナイ。「オツタワ」會談デ問題ニナツタ爭點ハ、印度ニ關スル限り、公平ナ且當然受クベキ考慮ヲ受ケナカツタ。ソシ

テ代表國ハ終始、印度ガ斯クノ如キ特意計畫ニ加入シナイナラバ、印度ノ英連合王國ニ對スル輸出貿易ハ必然的ニ減少シ困難スルデアラウトイフ懸念ニ附キマトハ、テキタトイフコトテ委員會ハ指摘セザルチ得又。印度政府自身モ本問題ニ加擔セル罪ヲ免レ得ナイ。

實際、鋼鐵及織維ニ於テ既ニ英本國ニ與ヘラレタ特惠ニ引續キ、英本国ニ特惠ヲ與ヘントスルノガ彼等ノ明瞭ナ意圖デアツタコトハ否定シ得ヌ事デアル。例ヘバ報告書ノ何處ニモ印度ノ諸外國トノ輸出貿易、ソレハ英連合王國トノソレノ殆ンド三倍ニモナルノデアルガ之ニ對スル重大ナル損害ノ可能性ニ對シ何ノ考慮モナサレテ般ラヌ機ニ見ラレルノデアル。

印度ノ輸出貿易全體ニ關スル考慮ハ何處ニモナカツタノデアル。殆ド總テノ外國ニ就テ、印度ハ夫等各國ニ對シ印度ガ其ノ國カラ輸入スルヨリモ遙カニ多クノモノヲ輸出シテキル。而シテ「ガーズン」卿ノ政府ハ三十年前賢明ニ「諸外國ノ報復ヲ招來スル」ヤモ知レヌ關稅特惠ノ讓與ヲ考慮スレントモ拒否シタノデアル。然シ利益ヲ

較量スルニ當ツテ代表團ハ新様ナ報復ノ可能性竝ニ印度輸出貿易ニ
對スルソノ影響ヲ考ヘテモミナカツタノデアル。

六印度ノ農業家ノ利益ハ、ソノ英國向輸出ガ減少シナイ様ニ英國ニ
特惠ヲ與ヘルコトヲ要求スルトイフコトガ主張セラレテ來タ。農業
家ニ對シテ斯クモ重大ナ關心ヲ有スルナラバ繰返スマデキ農業
家ニトツテ遙カニ重大性ヲ有スル他ノ諸國ニ對スル農業家ノ輸出ニ
本協定ガ與ヘル結果ノ見透シニ關シテ少クトモ幾ラカノ検討ヲ爲ス
コトガ至當デアツタ。代表團ハ英國ニ取ラレル二二パーントニ對
シテ農業生産ノ六四パーセントヲ吸收スル爾餘ノ市場ニ於ケル農業
家ニトツテ、ヨリ重要ナ是等ノ諸利益ノ何等ノ注意モ拂ハナカツタ
ソレ故ニ代表團ハ農業家ノ利益ノ爲ニ勵イタトイフノハ事實テ大袈
裟ニ作り更ヘタニ過ギヌノデアル

七報告書ノ中デ最モ驚クベキ部分ハ、或ル商品ヲ無稅目錄ニ載セル
コトニヨリ英連合王國ハ印度ニ恩恵ヲ與ヘツツアルコト竝ニ代表團
ガ英國代表團ヲ說得シタ結果印度ニトツテ若干ノ豫見出來又利得テ

得タト云フコトテ示ソウト企テテアル部分デアル。代表團モ印度ガ英國市場ニ於テ事實上專賣ニ等シイ權利ヲ持ツテキル商品ノ場合ニハ特惠ハ無價値デアノコトヲ承認シテキル。代表團ハ印度ガ斯機ヲ專賣權ヲ享受シテ牛ル生黃麻「ラツク」「ミラボラム」粉米、雲母及ビ或種ノ大麻ノ如キ商品チ列舉スル、ソレニモ拘ラズ代表團ハ大衆ヲシテ印度ハ是等英國產業ノ原料品ヲ無稅呂錄ニ載セルコトニ依リ英連合王國ニ恩寵ヲ受ケテキルト信ジサセヨウトシテ因難ナ辯解チスルノデアル。

八、ソレカラ又、英連合王國向印度輸出貿易計畫ヘノ印度ノ不參加ノ結果ニ門シラ代表團ノ商量ハ淺薄且一方的ナモノデアツタ。本貿易中ノ最大ノ品物ハ茶、黃麻、皮革類、原棉、油種デアル。我ガ委員會ハ代表團ノ氣ニシテキル危險ハ茶ノ場合ニハ、最モ誇張セラレタモノハアルト考ヘル。結局印度ハ英連合王國ニ對スル茶ノ最大ノ供給者デアリ、英連合王國市場ニ於テ印度ニ取ツテ代ラントスル「セイロン」ノ能力ハ限ラレテキル。斯クノ如キ生活必需品ノ輸入稅ハ必然的ニ消費者ノ上ニ課セラレル。茶ノ場合ニ就テハ非常ニ多ク述ベラレテ來タカラ今少シ詳シニ検討ヲ必要トスル。

印度ハ英連合王國ニ二億二千万「ルピー」ノ茶ヲ輸出スル第二ノ最大供給者「セイロン」ハ約一億八千万ヲ輸出スル。扱若シ「セイロン」ガ特惠ヲ得、我々ガ得ナイナラバ「セイロン」ハ英國市場ニ於テ我々ヨリモ安賣スルコトガ出來ルデアラウ、ソレハ勿論「セイロン」ニ印度輸出品ヲ全ク代表シ得タトシテノコトデアル。然シ「セイロン」ガソノ生産高ヲ二倍以上ニシ得ナイコトハ明ラカデアル。「セイロン」ガソノ生産ヲ四千万内至五千万ヘルビー増加スルコトヘ考へ得ラレルガソノ場合ニハ印度ト「セイロン」ノ輸出ノ形ハ丁度正反対ニナルデアラウ。然シ「セイロン」ガ二億二千萬ヲ供給スル地位ニ在ツタト假定シテモ英國ハ尙一億八千万ヲ必要トシ、前領印度カラノ供給ハ比較的少量ナノデソレチ印度ニ求メネバナラヌデアラウ。英國ノ欲スル一億八千万ノ印度茶ニ對スル割ノ關稅ハ唯單ニ英國ニ輸入セラレル總テノ茶ノ値段ヲ騰貴セシムル結果トナルニ過ギヌノデアル。ソノ場合ニハ「セイロン」ハ疑モナクソノ高イ價格ノ恩恵ニ欲スルデアラウ。ドチラニシテモ最モ打體ヲ受ケル者ハ印度ノ栽培者デアナク英國ノ消費者デアラウ。ソノ上代表團自身言ツテ尼ル通り、特惠ガ敷ケン

ニ與ヘラレ、輸入口ヘノソノ輸出總額ガソノ要求額ノ大部分ヲ成ス時ニハ、特惠ハ曰係口ノ何レノ口ノ生産品ノ爲ノ市場ヲ擴張スルニモサシテ役立タヌノデアル。

九、其故、英口ニ於ケル政府ガ英口消費者ノ重荷トナルガ如キ高額關稅ヲ茶ニ課稅スル事ハナイ事ハ明白デアツタ。又英口政府ガ印度ニ於ケル英口人茶栽培者ニ對シテ斯ノ如キ行動ニ出ル前ニ此等栽培者ノ利益ハ英口政府ト同等ノ重サガアルト確カニ希望スルコトガ出來ヨウ。然テ、彼等ノ利益ヲ擁護スルコトニ依リ印度人ノ茶ノ勞働者ノ利益モ自然ニ大切ニサレル事ニアロウ。

我ガ議員會ハ、印度ニ於ケル英口人栽培者ニヨツテ生產サレ英連合王口ノ大部分ノ人民ニヨツテ消費サレル或ル品物ガヨシ印度ガ本協定ヲ受付ケナカツタニモセヨ、何時デモ非常ニ増額サレタ重イ課稅ヲ受ケル機ナコトガアレバ非常ニ驚クトデアラウ。コノ關係ニ於イテ、生活費ヲ嵩嵩スル機ナ此レ以上ノ如何ナル賦課ニ對シテモ猛烈ニ反對スル最モ重要ナル財團ガ英口ノ政治ノ中ニアル事ニ氣ガ付クデアラウ。

一〇、貢販ノ場合ニ於テハ生産者トンテノ印度ノ獨占ハ勿論確認サレタ。貢販

製造業ノ場合ニ於テハ、印度製品ニ對スル一〇%ノ課稅ハ印度ニ於ケル
英門人製造業者ヲ害スルコトニナロウ。故ニ英門代表曰ガ此ノ類ノ品物
ニモ亦脅威テ加ヘタカ否カハ疑問デアル。ヨシ加ヘタトシテモ黃麻製品
ノ總輸出ノ六%位ノ影響ヲ與ヘタニ過ギナカツタデアツタロウ。九四%
、外國向デアツタ。

一一、綿布ノ場合ニ於テハ英聯合王曰ニ輸入サレル外國綿布ノ課稅ハ印度
代表團ニヨツテ提請サレタガ英門代表曰ハ斯ノ如キ提案ニハ同意シ得ヌ
旨ヲ明白ニシタ。英聯合王曰ニヨツテ我々ニ追加ノ市場ヲ與ヘルコトガ
出來タ唯一ノ重要キル品物ハ棉花デアツタ。然シ鵝絨ニ翁絨ナ特惠ハ全
ク拒否サレタ。改革サレタ型ノ印度棉ノ「ランカシャー」向輸出ヲ獎勵ス
ル爲メ處置ガ講ビラレルデアロウトノ歡慶ナル希望ガ申出デラレタ。ソ
ミテ代表團ハコノ希望ニ満足以上ノモノガアツタ。然シ乍ラ幾十年ノ努
力ニモ拘ラズ「ランカシャー」ノ要求シテ居ルガ如キ種類ノ棉花ハ印度ニ
於テハ充分ナ量ガ生産サレテ居ナイ事ヲ彼等ハ忘レテ居タ。彼等ハ亦、
假令、我々ガ將來ニ於テ更ニ多クノ改良種ヲ生産スルトシテモ此種ノ棉

棉花ノ印度紡績工場ガ現ニ輸入シテ居ルノデアルカラ彼等ガ此レノ一番ノ貢手トナルデアラウト云フ事實ヲ忘却シテ居ルノデアル。印度ノ生産者ガ印度紡績工場ノ増大シツツアル要求以上ニヨリ多量ノ此ノ種類ノ輸出シ得ベキ餘剰ヲ供給シ得ル時ハ遠イ。

而シテ代表團チシテ斯ノ如キ希望ノ内ニ印度ニ取ツテ何カシラ利益ガアルトスル誤ツタ信念ニ陥ツタリ又ハ大衆ヲ陥ラシメタリスル事ヨリ愁フニハ値カナ思慮チ費セバヨカツタノダ。棉花ハ英團代表團ガ印度ノ輸出貿易ノ爲メニ誠意ヲ表明スルコトノ出來得タ唯一ノ品物デアツタ。而シテ此レハ印度代表團ガ明白ニ特惠ヲ正シク主張シ得タ唯一ノ品物デアツタ。特惠ノ計畫ハ、此ノ下ノ於テハ日本及ビ他ノ國向ノ印度棉花ノ輸出ガ皆一様ニ減少サレル事ニナリ然モ此ノ品物ニ對スル英團ノ需要ガ之ニ相應シテ增加スル可能性ガナイノデ、印度人栽培者ノ利益ニ對シテハ明ラカニ有害デアルニ遺ヒナイ。

通常ナ棉花栽培ヲ補助金ニヨツテ吾團ノ他ノ場所ニ於イテ開墾セントスル企圖ガ英國ニヨツテ行ハレタ。

若シ此ノ事ガ棉花栽培ノ開發ニ於ケル英帝國政府ノ協力ノ方針ノ表示デアルトスルナラバ印度ハ協定第八條ニハ期待スル所ガ僅少デアル。

十二、「輸入スル」ヘ常ニ自國ノ製造業者ノ利益ヲ考慮毫末バナラヌ。ソレデアルカラ製造業者ノ費用ヲ惜マセル様ナ課稅ハ當然好マナイニ違ヒナイ。完成シタ工業製品ガ究極ニ於テ外「」ニ輸出セラレル時ニ特ニ然リト云フコトハ代表團モ實際ニ認メテ居ル。英聯合王「」ニ對スル我ガ輸出ノ大半ハ英「」ノ輸出工業ノ爲ノ原料カラ成ツテ居ル。又ソノ機少狀態デアルカラ印度ハ輸入稅法ノ施行ニヨツテ何等恐レルコトハナイ事ヲ委員ハ理解シテ居タ筈デアル。英「」產業ノ利益ガ正ニゾノ機少稅ヲ課稅スルコトニヨツテ生産費ヲ上グルヨウナ事ヲナス事ノ不得策ヲ英政府ニ示シテ居ツク事ダロウ。ナビナラ主要原料ニカケル輸入稅ハ原料ヲ使用スルトコロノ生産者ノ上ニ必然的ニカンラネバナラズ、ソレダケ外「」市場ニ於テ競争スル業者ノ能力ガ減少スル事ニナラネバナラヌカラデアル。ソノ上、英聯合王「」ヘ對スル印度ノ輸出ノ大部分ガ他ノ場所カラ容易ニ代ツテ得ラレルモノデナイト云フ事ハ明瞭デアツタニ違ヒナイ。ソレ故ニ、

カクノ如キ品目ニシ英聯合王國ガ印度ニ許與スル特惠ハ、見セカケデ
アリ、架空ノモノデアル。事實、我輸出ノ真ノ性質ヲ繕フルニ、如何ナ
ル方法ニテ印度ニトツテ價值アル何等カノ重要ナ特惠ガ英聯合王國ニヨ
ツテ與ヘラレルコトガ出來ルカヲ示スノハ雖シイコトデアル。

然シテ英聯合王國ニ對スル我ガ輸出貿易ノ一部分ガ餘り重要デナイ商品
ノ或ル種ノモノニ於テ我々ガ此ノ計畫ニ參畫シナイ爲ニ側道ニソレル可
能性ガアルト假定シテモ、ソノ損失ハ此ノ計畫ニ我々ガ參加シタ場合ニ
於ケル世界ノ他ノ諸國トノ我輸出貿易ニ於テ我々ガ直面スルデアロウト
コロノ損失ト較ベレバ何デモナイコトデアロウ。斯カル特惠ハ計畫カラ
生ズル英聯合王國カラノ印度向輸入ノ必然的ノ増加ハ諸外國カラノ輸入
チ目立ツテ減ズルニ違ヒナイ。ソシテ此ノ事ハ又諸外國ノ側ヲシテ印度
カラ物ヲ少ク買フ機ニサセル。ソシテ印度ガ諸外國ニ英國ニ對シテヨサ
モハルカニ多ク賣ルトイフ事ガ記憶サレル時、印度ノ輸出貿易上ノ帝國
ノ特惠ノ眞ノ結果ハ十分ニ想像サレル事ガ出來ル。

十三門稅トイフ武器ハ英政府ニヨツテ賣買手段トシテ英國品ノ爲メニ或

ル利益ヲ英帝國市場デ得ンガ爲ニ現在公然ト用イラレテキル。

印度代表曰ハ彼等ガ印度ノ爲ニ好取引ヲ爲シタト滿足シテキル機デアル。然シ我ガ委員會ノ意見デハ印度代表曰ハ英聯合王國向印度ノ輸出ニ對スル危險トイフ事ヲ恐レルノ餘リ一般國際貿易上、於中英聯合王國トノ貿易上ニ於ケル印度ノ位置ノ重大大サヲ看過シタモノデアル。代表曰ハ事態ノ最モ本質的ナ事實、即チ一方ニ於テ、英聯合王國ニ對スル印度ノ輸出ク殆ド食料、飲料、又ハ英産業ノ要求スル原料等ノ物品デアリ之等ノ大部分ハ代替ノ困難ナモノデアルコト、及ビ他方ニ於テ、印度市場ハ英國品ノ爲ニハ最モ大事ナ唯一ツノ市場デアリ、又現在ノ事情ノ下ニ於テハ英國製造業者ノ爲ニコノ市場ノ保留及ビ擴大ノ必要ハ過去ニ於ケルヨリ一層大ナルモノデアルト云フコトノ事實ニサヘモ認識シテキタナラ、印ウニハ見エナイ。若シ代表曰ガ之等本質的事實ヲ認識シテキタナラ、印度ハ他ノ英帝國ノ領土ヨリモ以上ニ張イ立場ニアルト云フ事ヲ彼等ハ理供シタコ達ヒナイ。ナビナラ英國ノ唯一ツノ最大市場トシテ印度ハ重要な利益ヲ提供シ得ル位置ニアリ、ソレ故想像上ノ損失ヲ恐レテ指圖ニ致ケル代リニ條件ヲ指圖スル立場ニアツタノデアル。若シ代表曰ガコノ事

チ、勘定ニ入レテ置イタナラ、彼等ハ協定ノ承認ニヨツテ英聯合王國ノ利益ハ印度ノ犠牲ニ於テ優位ヲ占メルヨウニナリ、又協定ノ不承認ニヨツテ、英聯合王國ノ損失ガ印度ノ損失ヨリ、ハルカニ大デアロウト

云フ結論ニ到達シタニ違ナシ。

若シキ之等根本的事實ニ留意シテキタナラ、又代表團ガ英國代表團ノヤリ方ヲ採用シ取引上同ジ歟シヲ用ヒテキタナラ、事情ハ全ク違ツテキタ事デアロウ。印度商品ニ不利ナ條件ヲ課スル機ナ英國ノ歛シニ對スル返答トシテ、代表團ハ同等ノ理由ヲ以テ既ニ鉛ト織物トテ與ヘラレテ居ル利益ヲ極図スルト時斯事ガ出來タ筈デアル。カクノ如キ當然ノ態度ガ英國代表團ニヨク判ルデアロウ事ハ彼等ガ既ニ現在アル特惠ニヨツテ英國ガ得テキル重要ナ利益ヲ十分ニ知ツテキルト云フ事實カラ理解シ得ラレルデアロウ。報告ノ第百節中ニ代表團ハ以下ノ事ヲ云ツテ居ル。「若シ差別門稅ガナカツタナラ、英聯合王國政府ハ事實上猶待セラレテ居ル為定ヲ結ブ覺悟デアリ又ハ差別門稅ガ廢止サレルナラバ協定ヲ無制限ニ續ケル覺悟デアロウト推測スル事ハ出來ヌ。」ト

コノ事ハ我ガ方ガ之レ以上ノ繪與チシナイデモ英國ノ嚇シハシヅメラ
レタデアロウシ又協定及ビ報告書ノ基礎トナツテキル英聯合王國ノ中
ノ印度ノ貿易ノ損失ノ恐レハ全ク消エテ無クナツタデアロウト云フ事
ヲ意味スルノデアル。取引上ノ非常ニ貴重ナ道具ハ拋棄サレテシマツ
タ。

十四此ノ協定ヲ額面通り解シテモ、我ガ委員會ハ代表國ガ其ノ報告
ニ於テ、兩國ガ期待シ得ベキ利益ニ關シ民衆ニ對シテ全ク誤レル印象
ヲ與ヘタモノト考ヘル。先づ第一ニ彼等ハ既ニ特ニガ與ヘランテキル
英聯合王國カラ輸入サレル最モ重要ナ商品即チ銅鐵ト織物テ除イテ印
度ハ僅カ千七百四十万磅ノ英國品ニツイテ英國ニ對シ特惠ヲ與フベク
武メラレルデサロウシ、一方印度ハ四千百八十万磅ノ商品ニツイテ英
國ヨリ特惠ヲ受ケルコトニナルト計算シテ居ル。然シ代表曰ハ假令除
外サレタ二千六百六十万磅ニ達スル種目ガ勘定ニ加ヘラレテモ均衡ガ
十分トレテ居ルト云フノデアル。ソレハ特惠ヲ受ケル筈ノ兩國ノ貿易
ノ價值ガ殆ド同一デアルト云フ事ヲ意味スル。ソウトシテモ英國ノ大

或大臣ハツイ先日下院デ印度ハ全輸入額ノ二六%ダケノ特恵ヲ與ヘタ
ト語ツタ。而シテ代表團ハ一九二九一三〇年ノ數字ヲ基礎ニシテキル
カラ其ノ割合ハ代表團ニ依テ見積ラレタ四千四百万磅（一千七百四十萬
磅、十二千六百六十萬磅）ニ對シ我々ガ英國ニ對シテ特恵ヲ與ヘバキル
商品ハ四千六百八十万磅ノ勘定トナル。

然シ何故代表團ハ斯クモ誤レル資料ヲ提供シ且我々ハ英國ニ對シテ我
々ノ輸入品ノ値カ千七百四十萬磅ニツイテ特恵ヲ與ヘルコトヲ求メラ
レテ居ルト示唆スル必要ガアルノカ？又何故彼等ハ最近ノ輸入稅法ニ
門係ナク最近數年間特恵ヲ受ケテ居ル印度茶ヲ英國向ケ輸入品カラ除
外シナイニ拘ラズ、鋼鐵及ビ綿製品ヲ我々ガ既ニ特恵ヲ與ヘタト云フ
理由デ印度向ケ輸入品カラ除外シタノニアロウカ？

若シ既ニ特恵ガ與ヘラレテ居ル商品ガ差引チスル爲ニ除カレルトスル
ナラバ、正シク此等商品ハ兩方ノ場合共除カレネバナラナイ。更ニ、
代表團自身協定ノ公明性ガ此ノ「ゾンザイナ試験」ニ依テ潤ラレ得ナ
イコトヲ承認シテ居ル。報告文ノ中ニ、「貿易協定ノ價值ガ既定サレ

得ル唯一ノ試験ハソレガ關係國ノ輸出貿易ニ於ケル増加力或ハコノ方法ヲトランケレバ減少スルカ又ハ全然無ニ歸スルデアロウ所ノ貿易ノ維持トナツテ現ハレル限度ニ極ツテ判ル」ト。徒ラニ機々シ筋違ヒノ取ルニ足ラヌ爭點ニ付テ駕説シテキナガラ、彼等ハ協定ニ當リ此ノ「唯一」ニシテ實際ノ試験ヲ一向ニ適用シヤウトハセズ又斯ル試験ニ於ケル印度ノ得失ノ見積リヲ算定シヤウトモシナカツタノデアル。

十五印度ノ民衆ニ對シテ公平ヲ期スル爲ニ代表團ハ各商店ノ場合ニ亘り十分ノ理由ヲ以テ、兩國ノ經り得ベキ貿易上ノ増加又ハ減少ノ見積リヲ試ミル可ヤデアツタ。我ガ委員會ハ報告書中ニ斯カル見積リノ爲ニ懇願デアツタ。委員會ハソレ故、印度ガ「堅實ナ且實質ノアル利益」ヲ得タト云フ、及ビ「印度ガ與ヘタモノハ國民ノ利益ニ何等損害ナク與ヘラレル」ト云フ單ナル主張ヲ受諾スルコトガ出來ナイノデアル。

何トナレバ、若シ我々ガ代表團ガ其ノ見積リノ基礎トシテ採用シタ年、即チ一九二九一三〇年分ノ入手シ得ル資料ニ彼等ノ言明シタソノ試験ヲ適田スルナラバ、我ガ委員會ハ結論ガ代表團ニ依ツテ假定サレタモノト

Def Doc No. 1835

全ク相反スルデアロウコトヲ確信シテキル。

一六、通商協定ノ價值ハ只將來得ラルベヤ利益フ基礎トシテノミ評價シ得ルモノデアル。其レ故ニ英聯合王國トノ此ノ協定ノ價值フ評價スルニハ若シ協定ヲ受諾スベキモノナラ兩國ガ輸出貿易ニ依ツテ得ルト思ハレル利益フ又若シ協定ヲ受諾シナイ場合ニハ其ノ損失フ算定スルコトガ必要デアル。勿論之ハ事ノ本質カラ云ツテ決定性又ハ確實性フ有シ得ナイ。然シ今迄ニ知ラレテ居ル經濟上ノ傾向ニ相當ナ注意フ以テ適用サレタ入手シ得ル資料ニ基ク算定ハ全然算定ノナイヨリモマレデアル。來年度ノ收入ト支出特ニ新シイ課稅額フ算定スル財務省ノ人間ハ同ジ基礎ノ上ニ立ツテキルノデアツテ相當ナ經濟的考慮ソ拂ツテ之ヲ出來得ル限り合理化スルノスレノナシ得ル總テナノデアル。現在ノ場合算定ノ方法ハ只一ツヨサアリ得ナイ。此一協定一依ツテ影響フ蒙ル各種ノ商品ノ各國カラ印度ニ輸入サレタ總額フ調べソレカラ英國カラノ同種ノ輸入高シ差引カバ英國ガ印度ノ市場ヲ獲得フ望ミ得ル最大限ノ額ガ解ル。然シ英國ハ特惠關稅ノ助ケフ以テシテモ特別ナ場合ヲ除イテハ恐ラク其ノ最大限ノ全部ヲ獲得スル事ガ出來ヌノハ明カデアル。故ニ我々ガ算定シナ

ケレバナラヌノハ此ノ最大限中ノ一部分ヲ獲得スル推定能力デアル。然シテ此ノ事ニ就イテハ多數ノ要因ガ考慮サレル。商品ハ各種ニ五リ其ノ長所及ビ今迄ニ解ツテ居ル趨勢ニ付イテ調べラレナケレバナラヌ。其ノ上ニ我々ハ國內産業保護、他國カラノ競争及ビ關係產業ノ擴張能力ノ諸要因ヲ考慮ノ中ニ加ヘネバナラヌ。我ガ委員會ハ此等全部ヲ考慮シタ結果大部分ノ種類ニ於テ英聯合王國ノ望ミ得ル最大限ハ推定限度ノ凡ソ五割ヲ獲得スルコトト考ヘル。特惠ヲ受クベキ商品ノ英聯合王國カラ印度ヘノ輸出ノ推定最大限ハ約七億五千萬デアル。ソシテ或種類ニアツテハ最大限ノ五割以下ガ獲得サレルカモ知レヌカラ、英國ハ印度ニ於ケル新貿易中ノ先ツ約三億「ルピー」ヲ獲得スルダロウト推算スルノガ合理的デアロウ。

一七、同様ニ印度ガ英聯合王國デ今迄ヨリ余計ニ獲得シ得ル市場ハ印度ノ輸出品ノ性質及前述ノ他ノ要因トニ正シク留意スレバ推定シ得ルノデアル。我ガ委員會ハ英國ノ市場ニ於テ印度ノ商品ニ與ヘタ特惠ニ依レバ右市場デ我々ガ得ベキ余分ノ貿易ハ恐ラク一億五千萬「ルピー」ヲ

出デナイデアロウト推定シテキルルデアル。其ノ大部分ハ我々ガ現在他國トシテキル貿易ノ轉換トナルモノデアリ此等諸國ノ我々ニ對スル購買力ハ英國ノ製品ガ印度ニ於テ受ケル特惠ノ結果我々ガ從來ヨリモ少ク此等諸國自リ買ヒ從來ヨリモ多ク英國ヨリ買フト同時ニ減少スルコトトナラジ。

一八、其故ニ若シ本協定ガ承諾サレナケレバ英國ハ三億「ルピー」ノ追加貿易ノ喪失ヲ甘受スルコトトナルノデアルガ、我々ノ方ハ受諾ノ際英聯合王國ニ期待シ得ル追加貿易ナルモノハ別ニ新規ノ貿易デハナク他國ト現在ヤツテ居ル貿易ノ轉換ニ過ギバイノデアルカラ喪失スル所又僅少ナノデアル。不承諾ノ場合ニハ勿論英國ハ我國ノ商品ノ或物ニ一割ノ稅ヲ課スルト隣シタノデアル英聯合王國ヘノ印度ノ輸出品ノ上位ニビ着目シ商品ノ性質ニハ依ルガ課稅ニヨル英國市場ニ於ケル收納額ハ一割乃至二割五分ニ過ギヌト我ガ委員會ハ推定シタノデアル。此ニ關聯シテ我々ハ印度ガ英聯合王國ヘノ主要供給者トナツテキル商品ダトカ英國自治領ヤ植民地ガソレゾレ競爭者トナリソウナ商品ダトカ我々ノ輸出力

フ制限サレテキル商品ダトカ又亞麻仁、銑鐵、棉ノ如キ特殊ナ品物フ考
慮ニ入レテキル。此等ノ要因フ凡テ考慮ニ入レルト協定不承諾ノ場合我
々ハ英聯合王國ヘノ輸出貿易ノ最高額一億「ルビー」ノ喪失ヲ受ケルコ
トニナリ之ニ對シテハ他ノ市場フ見付ケナケレバナラナクナルノデアル
然シ此ノ場合ハ英國ニ特惠フ與ヘルコトニナラナイノデ此等ノ輸出品
我國ノ輸出品總額ノ漸ク二割五分？一ヲ吸收スル外國市場ニ因ル譯ハナ
イノデアル。而モ又、此ノ内、外國ノ方ガ英本土ヤ英帝國ヨリ遙カニ多
ク買ツテクレルトイフ事モ頭ニ入レテ置カナケレバナラヌ。

一九、是等ノ見積リニ基キ貸借ノ精算ガ出來得ル。ソシテ本協定ノ
受諾サレレバ英國側ハ我々ヨリ遙カニ得ノ取レル立場ニ立ツノニ協定ノ
受ケ容レジナクトモ我々ハ殆ド損ヲシナ立場ニ置カレルト云フコトガ
分明スルコトデアロウ。ソシテ此ノ「バランス」ハ英國ニ特惠フ與ヘル
事ニ依ル印度ノ國內産業ニ加ヘラレル損害及ビ協定實施ニ伴フ附加稅額
ヲ考慮ニ入レテナイ。此ノ損害及ビ附加稅ハ我々ノ假ニ本協定ヲ拒否スル
トスレバ免レルモノデアル。

二〇、我ガ委員會トシテハ若シ英國ノ印度ヘノ輸入品ノ増加ガ少シ
 デモ低ク算定サレレバ印度ガ外國ノ輸入品ニ支拂ネバナラナイ高率ナ課
 稅額ハ一層大ナルモノトナリ又若シスカル輸入品ノ算定ガ一層高クナレ
 バ英國市場ニ於ケル印度ニ對スル互惠的利益ハ從テ一層大ナルモノトナ
 ルコトヲ指遁シタイ。換言スレバ印度ヘノ英國ノ輸入品ガ増加スレバ、
 關稅收入ハ特惠ノ爲ニ然モ其ノ増加ノ程度ニ應ジテ影響ヲ受ケ其ノ減退
 ハ新タル課稅ニ依リ補ハナケレバナラヌコト、ナラウ。若シ其レ等カ
 予期サレル程增加シ外國品ノ輸入ガ尚續クナラバ其等ノ外國品ニ對ス
 ル一層高率ノ稅金ハ國民ニ對スルソレ丈餘計ナ間接稅ヲ齎ハル。シカ
 ゼ前者ヲ採ル場合印度ノ市場ヲ英國ノ利益ヲ増ス曉ニハ印度ハ英國國市
 場ニ於テ平等ナ互惠利益ヲ當然要求シ得ルノデアル。前述ノ算定ニ鑑ミ
 我ガ委員會ハ一方ニ於テ英國國市場ニ於ケル印度ノ利益ハ比較的小サナ
 ソノトナリ勝チデアリ又他方本協定實施ノ爲課稅ニハ是非共相當ノ追加
 ガ加ヘラレバナラヌトイフイズレニシテモ、印度ノ犠牲大ナルヲ感メ
 ルノデアル。

二一、然シ本協定ガ印度ト大英帝國ノ間ノミデナク植民地帝國ニ
 関聯シテキルノダトイフ重大ナ事實ヲ考ヘル時ハ此ノ説明ヲ以テシテモ
 不完全ナモノナノデアル。「オツタワ」ニ於テハ時日不足ノ爲代表國ト
 自治領トノ間ニ何等ノ協定締結フモ見ズ爾後モ論議ハ行ハレタノデアル
 ガ交渉ハ印度政府ニ一任サレテキルノデアル。英本国政府トノ協定ニヨ
 リ定メラレタル植民領保護領及ビ委任統治領ノ場合ハ何等互恵主義ハト
 ラレテ居ラヌ何トナレバ若干ノ小植民地方招致セラレ印度商品ニ一定ノ
 條件ノ下ニ特惠フ與ヘルコトガ考ヘラレテキルニ反シテ「ケンヤ」「ウノ
 カンダ」「タンガニカ」「ザンジバル」—ニアザランド—北部「ロデシ
 ア」ノ一部、黃金海岸「ニゲリヤ」等ノ如キヨリ重要ナル植民地及ビ委任
 統治領ノソレ等ノ國際協定ノタメ何等特惠フ與ヘル地位ヲ受諾シタノデアル。更ニ是等植民領ヨ
 リ來ル商品ニ特惠ヲ與ヘル地位ヲ受諾シタノデアル。更ニ是等植民領ヨ
 リノ貿易ノ價值ヲ算定スルコトハ今迄ナサレナカツタシ又ソレハ不可能
 デアル。代表國ハ其等ノ大部分ニ就テ取引利潤ノ見込ノナイ事ヲ認メテ

キル。ソレ故ニ何等力見積リフスル上ニ「排シ難イ困難」ガアルノデアル。同時ニ是等植民領ノ若干ハ大キナ貨物集散貿易ニ從事シテ居リ從特定ノ商品ガ事實件ノ植民領カラ來タノカドウカヲ確メル上ニ大キナ管理上ノ困難ガアル。印度市場ニ於ケル高價ナ特權フカヤウニ多數ノ植民領ヘ云フニ足ル程ノ返償フ得ズシテ分チ與ヘル協定ニ代表團ハドウシテ署名シ得タノデアラウカ不可能ナ事デアル。

二二、植民領帝國ノ殘餘ノ部分、即チ我々ニ特惠フ與ヘヌ様ニサセラレタ植民領保護領委任統治領ヲ除イタ部分ダケニ局限スルニシテモ代表團ハ何ヨリモ先ツ東方市場ニ於テ他ノ亞細亞諸國デ產出サレル米トノ激烈ナ競争ニ對應セネバナラヌ印度米及ビビルマ米ノタメ特惠ヲ得ベキ努力ハ結實シナカツタ事フ認メルモノデアル。「セイロン」及ビ「マレー」ハ事實米ニ輸入稅ヲ課シテキルノデアル。帝國ノ商品ニ或ル程度ノ特惠フ與ヘル「ファイジー」ハ我々ニハ何等特別ナ特惠ヲ與ヘ得メ何トナレバ我々ハ砂糖ハ印度ノ保護産業ナル故「ファイジー」ノ砂糖ニ特惠ヲ與ヘ得ナイカラズアル。「マウリティース」モ亦我々ガ同地ノ砂糖ニ特惠ヲ與

ヘナケレバ我々ニ何等ノ特惠ヲ許シ得ナイ所デ我々ニハソレハナシ得ナ
 イノデアル。西印度諸島「シエラ・レオン」「ガンビア」「ソマリラン
 ド」「ジブラルタル」及ビ「サイブラス」ハ帝國ノ產物ニハ特惠ヲ與ヘ
 ル。シカシ代表團自身ハ唯一ノ最モ重要ナル印度輸出品ハ年額約四百万
 ルビニ上ル西印度諸島ヘノ黃麻製品及ビ米デアル事ヲ認メテキル。香
 港ハ内陸地ノナイ港ニ過ギナイソシテ同地ノ貿易ハ主トシテ物資集散貿
 易デアル從テ帝國ノ如何ナル部分ニモ何等ノ特惠ヲ與ヘ得ヌ立場ニ在ル
 「マレイ」ノ場合、代表團ハ我々ハ受取ルヨリセヨリ多クフ與ヘネバナ
 ラヌト云フコトヲ認メテキル。ソシテ植民地帝國全体トシテ者ヘテ見テ
 吾彼等ハ印度ハ「植民地帝國カラ特惠ヲ受ケル商品ノ價值ヨリモ若干高
 イ價值ヲ持ツタ商品ニ特惠ヲ與ヘルヤウニナル。勢力多分ニ見ラレルコ
 ト」及ビ我々ハ「不利ナル貿易平衡」ヲ匡正スルタメニ我々ノ製品輸出
 振興ニ期待セネバナラヌコトヲ躊躇シ乍モ認メテキル特惠ニ關スル凡ニ
 ル企圖ガ英本國ノ製品ノ印度ヘノ輸入增加ノタメニ計ラレテキル際代表
 團ハ我々ノ製品ヲ増加スル事ヲ眞面目ニ望ンデキルノデアラウカ。

二三 印度貿易ノ英聯合王國ヘノ轉換ニ關スル上記ノ如キ測定ガ、明カニ一
方的ナ植民帝國トノ協定ノ性質ト共ニ考慮サレルナラバ、本協定ヲ全
体トシテミテ、ソレハ受ケルヨリモ與ヘル方ガ造刀ニ多イ様ニ策定サ
レタトイフ結論ガ只々認メラレルバカリデアル。

二四 我ガ委員會ハ此ノ事柄ノ他ノ面ニ注意ヲ換起シケレバナラナイ。

印度人ニ賦與セラレタ待ニマダ 改善ノ餘地アル植民領、然シテ
過去幾年間ニ至り植民領官廳ニ對シ向ケラレタ印度ノ最モ悲シムベキ
苦情ノ一デアツタ。植民領ニ對シ我々ガ特惠ヲ與ヘルコトヲ要求サレ
テキルコトハ悲劇的ナ皮肉デアル。印度ノ市民等ガ或ル植民領或ハ自
治領ニ於テ市民權ヲ 承否サレテキル場合、ソ、植民領ヤ自治領カラ
ノ原料ヤ製品ガ印度ニ於テ特惠ノヲ屬ヲケルコトヲ暗示スルノハ正
義ノ滑稽化デアル。條約締結當事國ガオ互ノ市民ニオ互ノ領土ニ入國
シ旅行シ居住シ、又財産ヲ所有シ彼等ニ如何ナル特別稅ヤ賦課金ヲモ
譲セザル相互ノ権利ヲ與ヘル事ガ商業條約ヤ取締ノ一設ニ認メラレタ
習慣デアル。英帝國內ニハ印度市民ニカ、ル基本的権利ヲ與ヘナイノ

ミカ實際彼等ニ差別的ノ立法ノソレ以上ノ困難シテキル植民領ガアルノデアル、而モ今ヤ我々ハ彼等側ニ於テカ、ル慣習的權利スラ印度市民ニ與ヘル事ヲ何等爲サズシテ彼等ニ特恵ヲ與ヘルベキ事ヲ要求サレテキルノデアル。代表團ハ此ノ點ニ彼等ガ注意ヲ拂ハナカツタトハ云ヒ得ナイ。何故ナレバ我ガ委員會ハ帝國印度市民協會ノ會長ガ代表團ノ長ゴノ件ニ關シ打電シタ事ヲ知ツテキルカラデアル。我ガ委員會ハ印度人ヲ差別待遇シテキル植民領ニ特恵ヲ與ヘルコトニ盡瘁スルコトニ於テ印度政府ハ最近多年ノ間彼等ノ名譽ニアツタ植民領及自治領ニ於ケル印度人ノ権利擁護ヲヒドク減殺スル事ニナルデアラウト考ヘテキル。印度人ニ對スルコノ差別待遇ガ植民領ニ於テ行ハレテキル限りカ、ル植民領ノ物品ニ特恵ヲ與ヘルコトハ毀損ニ加フルニ侮辱ト解スル以外ニナイ

二五報告書ハ既ニ指遁シタ如ク誤解ニ導クノミナラズ不協定カラ生起スルニツノ重要ナ面ヲ看過シテキル即チ印度貿易ノ他國ニ於ケル損失トソノ協定ヲ實行サス場合ニ關聯シテ生ズル間接稅ノ増徵デアル。我々ハ

既ニ世界ノ他地方トノ印度ノ貿易シレハ總計ニ於テ我々ニ達カナル影響ヲ有スルモノデアルカ一顧ダニサレタ事カナイ事實ニ言及シタ本協定ノ實施方法ニ關スル限り關稅ニ多クノ改正ヲ要シソノ結果充分非難サルベキ間接稅増徵ヲ生ズル事ハ明ラカデアル。若シ特惠カ現在ノ輸入稅ノ削減ニヨツテ與ヘラレルナラバソノ結果タル關稅歲入ノ穴ハ租稅增徵ニヨリ補ハレネバナラナイ若シシレガ現在關稅ノ增加ニヨツテ與ヘラレルナラバソノ增加ノ間接稅ノ増徵トナルデアラウ。從ツテ何レノ場合ニモ特惠ノ直接間接ノ租稅增加ニヨリテノミ與ヘラレル事ガ出來ルノデアル。英國ノ對印輸入ヲ増加スル爲ニ貧シキ印度市民ニ稅フカケテヨイト云フ理由ハ全然アリ得ナイ。

二六 我が委員會ハ、若シ英國製品ガ現行關稅ノ減額ニヨリ特惠ヲ受ケルナラバ、斯クシテ其等トノ猛烈ナル競争ニ突然直前セントスル印度ノ發達期ニアル各産業ノ地位及ビ將來ノ見込ニ關シ何カ熱心ナル考慮ガ代表團ニヨツテ拂ハレタカ否ヤヲ疑フモノデアル。若シヤツト根ヲ下シ始メタバカリノ多數ノ國內産業ニ及ボス影響ヲ測ル試ミガ行ハレタナラバ、其等ノ多クハ猛烈ナ競争ニ曝サレテ滅亡ノ虞ガアルト云フ事ニ氣付クデアロウ。

此ノ種ノ事ヲ具陳スル場合總テノ斯ノ如キ産業ノ將來ノ見込ニ到ルマデ言及スルコトハ我が委員會ニ取ツテハ勿論不可能デアル。彼等ハ二三ノ例ヲ舉ゲ得ルニ過ギナイ。石鹼製造工業ニ其ノ例ヲ取ル。印度ニ於ケル無數ノ石鹼工場ノ發達ニ伴ヒ、外國石鹼ノ輸入ハ過去四年間ダケデモ、五百万「ルピー」ヨリ二百八十万「ルピー」ニ減少シタ。此等ノ工場ノ現在生産高ハ紅二百万「ルピー」ト見積ラレ、其ノ生産能力ハ約五百二十万「ルピー」ト見積ラル。

換言スレバ、今日其等ハ其ノ生産高ヲ倍加出來ルシ又全輸入品ニ代替スル事ガ出來ル。然シ本協約ハ彼等ニ重大ナ打撃ヲ與ヘルデアロウ。何故ナラ十%ノ特惠ガ英國製石鹼ニ附與サレルト云フコトハ一現在ニ於イテサエ

輸入石購ノ八十%ガ英國ヨリ來テ居ル——確カニ印度製造業者ヲ自己ノ市場カラ驅逐スル目論見デアル。ソシテ英國ニ特惠ヲ附與スルナラバ印度工業ニ深刻ナル弊害ヲ及ボスガ如キ此種ノ事例ハ實際倍加サレ得ル。

二七、他ノ種類ノ例ヲ取ル。本協約ハ英國ヨリ我ガ國ヘ輸入サレル「アルミニューム」環、板及ビ製品ニ十%ノ特惠ヲ附與スルコトヲ求メテキル。斯ノ如キ環及ビ板ヲ輸入シテ此等ヲ延長シテ什器ニスル多數ノ國產工場ガ印度ニアル。同時ニ、英國ニ於ケル「アルミニューム」大製造業者モ亦我ガ國ニ於什器製造工場ヲ設立シテキル。其故ニ英國製「アルミニューム」環及板ニ與エラレタ十%ノ特惠ハ、印度製造業者ヲ英國「アルミニューム」財團ノ手中ニ歸セシメル。ソシテ此等財團自身印度ニ自己ノ工場ヲ所有シテ居ルノダカラ、印度製造業者ニ對シ供給ヲ潤滑セシメ彼等自身ノ工場ヲ擴張スルコトニヨツテ印度製造業者ヲ其ノ自身ノ市場カラ驅逐スルコトハ彼等ニトツテ易々タルコトデアロウ。

二八本協約ニ直接ニ關係アル重要論點カラ離レテ本協約ガ影響ヲ及ボスモノ

ト思ハレル政策上ノ基本問題ガアル。例ヘバ鋼鐵及ビ綿布關稅法ヲ通過シタ
トキ英國製品ニ特恵ガ與ヘラレタ方法ニモ拘ハラズ、代表國ハ此ニハ就ガ國
ノ財政政策ノ一部デアルト思ツテ居タ。此ノ事ガ就ガ國ノ産業政策ノ新問題
ヲ提供スル。即チ、印度産業ニ對スル保護ハ英國製造業者ガ利害干係ヲ有ス
ル様ナ場合ニ於テハ保護計畫其ノ物ガ英國製品ニ對スル特恵ヲ包含スル様ナ
狀態ノ支配ノ下ニ與ヘラルベキデアルカ否カトイフ問題デアル。此ノ事ハ彼
等自身ノ利益ノ爲ニハ英國ニ相反シテサエ保護ヲ要スル産業商品ノ場合ニハ
英國商品ニ對シ特恵ヲ與ヘナイシ又與ヘ度クナイ自治領ノ政策ハ不思議ナ對
照ニアルコトハ我ガ委員會ノ指摘ヲ要ザル所デアル。

二、九 國家經濟政策ガ印度ニ於テ確立サレ政府ニヨツテ承認サレ受達サルニ
非レバ本協約ハ國民ノ利益ニ相反スルコトヲ指摘シ得ヨウ。貿易協約トイフ
モノハ英國ガ自國ノ場合ニ行フコトヲ欲スル如ク一國ノ製品ニ最大ノ利益ヲ
與ヘ生産が増大サレル結果トナルモノデナケレバナラナイ。ソシテ特恵ハ節
度ニ於テ製造サレヌカ又ハ製造スルコトノ出來ナイ様ナ品物ノミニ及ボサナ
ケレバナラナイ。

印度ガ自力デ製造スル事ガ出來セネバナラヌノニ印度ノ鋼棒ガ英聯合王國ニ輸出サレ、彼處デ鋼板ニツクラレ印度ニ再ビ積戻サレネバナラナイ事ハ常識並ビニ經濟學的思慮ニ相反スルト思ハレル。

印度ノ產業政策ハ更ニ追加鋼鐵協約中ニアル産業上ノ協力ノ原則ヲ承認スル事ニヨツテ斯様ニ逆ナ影響ヲ受ケルコトニナロウ。若シ此ノ地位ガ受諾サレレバ只今論及シタ政策ノ變化ト共ニ印度ハ半製品ヲ製造スル地位ニマデ低下スルデアロウ。又印度ハ國內製造及雇傭ノ機會モ否定サレルデアロウ。ソシテ印度ノ納稅者ハ英國人ノ製造家ガ此等嘗製品ヲ印度市場向完製品ニシズル利益ヲ得テ斯クシテ英國ニ於ケル失業救濟ノ助ケトナル爲ニ税金ヲ支拂フコトヲ要求サレルコトニナロウ。ソシテ附帶的にハ英國ノ船腹ニ餘分ニ積荷ヲ與ヘルコトニナロウ。海運業ニ關スル限り特惠ノ全般的計畫ハ印度ノ海ニ就イテ既ニ優勢ナル位置ニアル英國海運業ヲ印度ノ海運業發達ヲ妨害シテ増強スルノミデアル。

三〇、代表團ハ又實際上ノ關稅特惠トハ別ニ、英國ノ品物ハ既ニ各種ノ他ノ方法デ我國ニ於テ實質的ナ特惠ヲ得テ居ル事ヲ考慮スルヲ怠ツタノデアル。

行政上ノ取極我國ニ於テ英國ガ投資シテキル事實、同國ノ通貨政策ノ操作、而シテ亦既ニ施行サレテキル保護計畫中ノ特惠手段ノ實施等ニ依リ、英國ノ品物ハ既ニ印度市場ニ於テ特惠ヲ得テ居リ、ソレニ對シテ印度ハ十分ナ報酬ヲ少シモ受ケテ居ナイノデアル。事實英國ハ常ニ、印度ヘ原科生産國デアラネバナラヌ。

ソシテ英國ノ品物ノ爲ノ自由、解放市場デアラネバナラヌトイフ基礎ノ上ニ行動シ來ツタ。

同國ハ過去「ランカシャ」ノ利益ノ爲ニ國產稅ノ賦課ニ依ツテ利益ヲ擧げ來ツタノデアル。同國ハ英國財閥ノ爲ニ印度通貨竝ニ爲替ヲ操作シ來リ現在尙印度ニトツテ非常ニ不利益ナコトニ金ノ自由輸出ガ許サレテキルノデアル。

英國ガ金本位制ヲ脱シ「ルピー」ガ否應ナシニ法定率デ英貨ニ「リンク」

サレテ以來、英國ノ印度向輸出ハ金本位制諸國ヨリモ約三割三分ノ特惠ヲ得テ來タ。コレハ法定「レート」一對四カラ一對六ヘノ引上ノ通貨操作ニ依リ既ニ英國輸出品ニ與ヘラレタ一割二分五厘ノ利益ニ加ヘテノコトデアツタ。是ニ加ヘテ本協定ハ更ニ一割ノ附加的利益ヲ彼等ニ與ヘルコトヲ提案シ、ソシテコレガ印度代表團ガ印度ニトツテノ實質的利益ト秋ビ稱シテキルトコロノモノナノデアル。

英國製造業者ノ利益ノ爲コレ以上犠牲トナル考ヲ抱クヨリモ先づ通貨操作ニヨリ英國ガ既ニ得タ利益ニ對スル代償ヲ主張シタ方ガ公正且合理的デハナカツタラウカ。

三一、差シ懸ツタ憲法改正ニ鑑ミテ若シ今後ノ印度政府ガソレヲ廢棄セントスルナラバ容易ニソレガ出來ル様ニ本協定ハ當事者一方ノ六ヶ月ノ豫告期間ヲ認メル旨ガ規定セラレタ。貿易協定ヲ破棄スルコトノ困難ハヨク知ラレテキル。見ヨ、英本國政府サヘモガ一方ニ「ランカシャ」ノ、他方ニ印度紡積工業ノ苦境アルニモカ、ハラズ英日貿易協定ノ破棄ヲ躊躇シタデバナイカ。「オツタク」協定中ノ六ヶ月ノ了告期間ニ關スル條項

ハ或ル人々ニ適當ナ時ニ本協定ヲ破棄スルコトガ出來ルノデアルカラ協定ハサシテ害ニナラヌデアラウト誤信セシメタノデアツタ。コレハ、先づ第一ニ憲法改正ノ下ニ於テハ印度ハ若シ同國ガ適當ト考ヘルナラバスクノ如キ協定ヲ破棄スル權力ヲ持ツタ自治國ノ地位ヲ獲得スルデアラウコトヲ假定スルモノデアル。政府ガ第三次圓卓會議ノ爲ニ代表ヲ集メントシ始メテキル方法ハ斯クノ如キ希望ノ抱懷ヲ保證シナイデアラウ。ソシテ政府ハ、總テノ實際的ナ目的ノタメニ斯クノ如キ權力ノ行使ヲ實效ノナイモノトスル憲法ヲ印度ニ施行スルデアラウトイフ事ハ一般的ニ判ツテキル。印度ガ極メテ近キ將來ニ於テソノ様ナ狀態ニ達スルトシテモ、新憲法ハ實際ニ機能ヲ發シ始メル迄ニハ二年乃至三年ヲ要スルデアラウ此ノ期間ノ間ニ新シイ貿易關係ハ形成セラレ、多クノ貿易ノ道ハ變更セラレルデアラウ。而シテ斯クテ創設サレタ既得權益ハ本協定ノ廢棄ニ對抗スル強力ナ勢力ドシテノ役目ヲ勤ムルデアラウ。而シテ此ノ間終始實質的ナ損害ガ引續キ此ノ國ニ與ヘラレルデアラウ。

六ヶ月ノ予告期間ニ關スル條項ガ本協定ノ及ボス禍ニ對スル防護物ト誤

解セラレ易イトイフ事實ガナカツタナラバ我ガ委員會ハコノ面ヲ述ベルコトヲ考慮シナカツタデアラウ。本協定ガ健全ナモノデアルカ何ウカ、或ハ印度ニ利益デアルカドウカ、或ハ亦予告條項ハ本協定ヲ幾テカデモ受諾シ得ルモノニスルカ何ウカヲ眞面目クサツテ議論スルノハ無用ノコトデアル。世人ハ殆ンド本協定ハ長イ間約束セラレソシテ辭ケラレテ來タ政治變革ノ確立ヲ見越シテ將來ノ聯邦議會ノ兩手ト自由ナル採擇ヲ封ゼントスルモノデアルト信ズルニ至ツテキルノデアル。

三二、經濟的見地ノミカラミテ、協定ハ餘リニモ根本的ニ不充分ナモノデアルノデ代表團ガ遠慮ナク拒否シナカツタ事ヲ我委員會ハ警イテキル報デアル。

英自治領ト英國間ノ經濟取極ニ如何ナル名稱ガ與ヘラレヤウトモ英聯鎣蓋國ト印度間ニ於ケル斯カル取極ヲ「協定」ト呼ブ事ハ全々誤稱デアル政治的ニ不平等且ツ從屬セル國家ト其レヲ支配スル國家トノ間ニ正シイ正當ナ取極メガ事實有リ得ル事デアラウガ。

政治的ノ問題ガ解決サレナイ限り又印度ニ自治統治ガナイ限り、英聯合

王國ト印度間ニハ、貿易協定ガアルワケハナイ。ナゼナラバ只自由立法部ガコノ種ノ取極メヲ自由ニナス事ガ出來ルノデアル。又我ガ委員會ハ若シモソレヲ公的團体指名サレタル役員及「ヨーロッバ」人ニ依ツテ現議會ヲ通過サセルナラバソレハ印度及英聯合王國間ノ問題解決ノ基礎デナナク長引ケル苦難ノ基礎ヲ作ル事ニナルト政府ニ警告シテキルノデアル三三、本協定ヲ求メタ態度、動機及方法ニ關シ、我委員會ハ只次ノ事ヲ云ヒタイノデアル。英聯合王國政府ハ威嚇ヲ用ヒテ印度ニ約定ニ入ルヨウニ誘ツタ。印度ノ代表者達一一一印度政府ノ被告者一一及ソノ専門的顧問達ハ威嚇ノ性質ヲ檢ベヤウトモセズ同意シタ。

彼等ハ又彼等ニ對シ不平等ニ差別スル事ニ同意シタト云フ彼等ノコノ現實ノ屈服ノ爲自分ヨリ強イ攻撃者ノ多クニヨツテ背後カラキズツケラレソウナ事ニ眼ヲ閉ヂテ又同様ニ英國トノ我輸出貿易ニ代償的増加ヲ與ヘル事ヲセズシテ他國トノ印度ノ貿易ノ必然的ニ減少シテ從來ヨリ一層優勢トナツタ印度貿易ニ於ケル英國ノ地位ノ成行ヲ無視シテソレガ頗ル苦痛ヲ來スモノデアルト信ズルヨウ彼等自身ヲ諒致シタ。

三四、英國ト印度トノ間ノ貿易關係ノ全歴史中ニハ印度國民ヲ彼等ノ利益ト少シモ一致セズ且明白ニ受託者自身ノ利益ニナルヨウナ道ニ無理ニ引キ入レル受託益ノコレ以上情ケナイ例ハ今マデニナカツタノデアル。要スルニ只ソレハ一層經濟上ノ支配ヲ得ントスルコトヲ意味シテキルノデアル。ソシテ經濟的支配力ヲ強クスル事ハ必然的ニコノ國ニ政治的支配力ヲ増加スルヨウ、ナ結果ヲ生ズルノデアル。

三五、「オツタワ」ニ於テ彼等ノ目的ヲ達シタノデソレガ決シテ利己的ナモノデハナイト世界ニ宣言サレタ。ソレハ利他的デアル。又ソレハ一種ノ「ヂエスチャード」デアリ世界ニ對シ關稅ノ障壁ヲ低メル様ニ稟請スルモノデアル。確カニ世界經濟會議ニ對スル適切ナル序曲デアル。我々ハスクリ如キ障壁ヲ少クスル只一つノ道ハ更ニ多クノ障壁ヲ置ク事デアル信ズル様ニ要請サレテキル。又暗々裡ニ我々ハ印度ノ關稅ヲヘラシ印度ノ保護貿易主義者ノ政策ヲ止メサセルヨウニスル事ガ印度ノ利益デアルト信ジサセラレルヨウ要請サレテキル。尙ソノ上、首相ハ「オツタワ」協定ヲ手ニ持ツテ英國政府ハ世界ノ他諸國ト貿易協定ヲ結ブ熱心ナ意向

ヲ持ツテキルト宣言シタ。若シモ彼等ガ成功スルナラ、又彼等ノ倫理的
歸結ニ合フ様ニ取引ヲ進メルナラ特惠ノ一般的附賦ハ印度ニ押シツケタ
名目上ノ特惠スラ否認スル事ニナロウ。

(1) 三六、約言スレバ、我ガ委員會ハ本協定ト其ノ結果カラ生ズル情勢ハ次ノ
如キモノデアルト云フ意見ヲ持シテキル。

本協定ハ元來印度ノ必要ヤ希望ニハ基ズカズシテ英國ノソレニ共イテキ
ル。本協定ガ作ラレ又實施セラレルヨウニナツタ事情ニ稽査シ本協定ハ
望マル人ノ上ニ押シツケラレタモノデアリ又ソレ故ニ現在ノ場合ニ於テ
兩國間ノ親善關係ヲ助長シ得ベキモノデハナイ。

(2) 本協定ハ印度貿易ニ於ケル現在ノ英本国ノ支配的地位ヲ恒久化シ、更ニ
擴張スルデアラウ。コレハ國際貿易ヨリ最大ノ利益ヲ獲得シ得ルタメニ
ハ、國ハ、貿賣者トシテ又購買者トシテ出來ル丈ヶ多數ノ國ト——換言
スレバ出來ルダケ廣大ナ市場ト出來ルダケ廣大ナ供給源ト——廣汎ナ貿
易關係ヲ持タネバナラヌトイフ經濟原則ソノモノニ反スル。更ニ其ノ結
果英本国、經濟的支配ヲ強メルコトハ、英國ガ將來割り出ス既得權益ニ

關シ其ノ政治的支配ヲ永久的ノモノトシ鞏固ナモノトスルニ役立ツノミデアラウ。

(3) 本協定ハ、互惠原則ニ基イテキナイ。何トナレバ、英連合王國ハ印度市場ニ於テ、實質的ノ利益ヲ收メル見込アルニ反シテ、印度ノ利益ハ、縦へ、アルニシテモ甚ダ小ナルモノデアル。代表團ハ交渉ヲ取極メル上ニ現存ノ印度ノ關稅ヲ效果的ニ利用スル事が出來ナカツタ。

(4) 本協定ハ植民領ノ場合即チ、ソノ植民領ノ大半ガ我々ニ何等ノ特惠ヲ與メラレヌヤウニナツテ居リ又ソノ植民領ニ對シソノ様ナ事情ニモ拘ラズ我々ノ方デハ特惠ヲ與ヘル事ヲ要求サレテキルヤウナ植民領ノ場合ハ、全ク互惠原則ヲ無視シテキル。殘餘ノ部分ノ場合ハ我々ハ、與ヘルモノハヨリ多ク受ケ取ルモノハヨリ少イコトヲ要請サレテキル。更ニ、自治領トノ協定モコレカラ締結ノ選ビトナルノデアル。

(5) 本協定ハ、我々ノ商品ニ對スル他國ノ購買力ヲ低下セシメルデアラウ、何トナレバ我々ハ、英連合王國カラ、遙カニ大ナル割合デ輸入品ヲ入手スルカラデアル、カクテ他國カラノ我々ノ輸入從テ他國ヘ我々ノ輸出モ

若シク減ズルコトトナラウ、ソシテ、ソノ淺少ハ、英連合王國ヘノ我々ノ輸出ガ比例的ニ増加シテモ均衡ガ保レルヤウニナル見込ミハナイ。本協定ハ、此ノ重要ナ要因ヲ全然不問ニ附シテキル。

(6) 本協定ハ、諸外國ヨリ直接的或ハ消極的ノ報復ヲ招クコトトナラウ。

諸外國トノ貿易總額ニ我々ニトツテ、英連合王國トノ貿易總額ヨリ遙カニ重大大ナ影響ヲ持ツノデアル。

(7) 本協定ハ、國民ガ既ニ過重ナ税ヲ拂ツテキル時ニ更ニ開擴税ヲ課スル結果ヲ招來スルコトハ必至デアル。但今將來、印度政府ノ財政狀態ガヨクテルニシテモ、他ノ諸外國カラノ商品ニ課セラレル此ノ困難可能ツ税ガ多額ニ成サレルコト一ラウ。

(8) 本協定ハ、英國品ガ特惠ヲ受クベキ商品ニ於テ印度産業ノ發展ヲ著シク阻害スルデアラウ、ソシテ多數ノ初期的産業ガ我國市場ヨリ遷遂サルデアラウ。此等ノ商品ノアルモノニ於テ將來アル時ニ於テ印度ノ産業ガ保護ヲ要スルコトガ明カニナツテモ保護ハ、鋼鐵及ビ機物ノ場合ノ如ク、英國商品ニ特惠ヲ與ヘルトイフ基準ニ立ツテノミ與ヘラレルモ

ノトナラウ。

(9) 本協定ハ、英印間ノ産業協力ヲ創始スルモノデアル。同政策ハ、印度ヲ半製品製造ノ地位ニ引き下ゲルデアラウ。ソシテ、印度ノ納稅者ハ、英國ノ製造業者ヲシテ印度ノ市場ノタメニカ、ル製品ヲ完全ナ生産品ニ

本國ノ製造業者ヲシテ印度ノ市場ノタメニカ、ル製品ヲ完全ナ生産品ニ

(10) スル利益ヲ得サシメルタメ納稅スルコトヲ要求サレルデアラウ。

印度ヘノ英國ノ輸入ヲ増シ英國ヘノ我が輸出若干ヲ轉換セシメル本協定ハ、我々自身ノ海運ニ支障ヲ與ヘ英本國ノ海運ノ支配ヲ強メルニ役立ツ

ダケデアラウ。

(11) 六ヶ月ノ豫告期間ヲ以テ、協定ヲ廢棄スル權利トイフ所謂安全保障ハ虚

妄ノ事デアル。

(12) (イ) 印度ガ協定ヲ受諾シナイ場合ニハ一定ノ印度商品ニ對スル課稅ニ依リ英國市場ニ於ケル印度貿易ハ損失ヲ蒙ル虞ガアルイフハ頗ル大袈裟デアリ不必要ナ誇張デアル。何トナレバ、英連合王國ハ、食料品飲料品又ハ同國ガ製造ノ目的ヲ以テ必要トスルモノニハコレ以上稅ヲ課スルコトハナイデアロウトイフコト。

(ロ) 英連合王國ハ、同國ガ我方ヘノ輸出ヲ増加セント欲スル限りハ、印度力

ラノ輸入ヲ減ズル如キコトハナイデアラウ。

(八) 危険ニ陷ルヤウナ貿易ノ量ハ假令アツテモ非常ニ小サナモノデ我々ハ、
必要トアラバ其ノ爲ニ他ノ市場ヲ見出スコトガ可能デアラウ。ソシテ。
。。。。。。。

(二) 此ノ様ナ他ノ市場ヲ見付ケネバナラヌ事ノ困難ハ前ニ舉ゲタ凡テノ不利
益ニ比較スレバ取ルニ足ラヌモノデアル。

三七、結論トシテ我ガ委員會ハ、本協定ハ全体トシテコノ國ノ經濟生活、
財政組織ニ及ボス複雜ナ影響ヲ判断サルベキデアル事ヲ強調セントスル
モノデアル。何故ナレバ之等ハ相互關係ヲ有スルカラデアル。
代表國ノ英國市場ニ於ケル印度貿易ノ損失ノ脅威トイフ一面ニ對スル強
調ハ本協定ニ全ク誤ツタ歪メラレタ概観ヲ與ヘテキル、而シテ之ハ所謂
印度農民ノ利益擁護ニ託セバ英國產業ノ爲ノ宣傳ノ一片ニ過ギナイモノ
トシテ不可トスペキデアル。

何故ナレバ本協定ハ少シモ印度農民ノ利益ヲ擁護シテ居ナイカラデアル
ソレハ只他國カラノ印度貿易ヲ聯合王國ニ轉換スル爲ニ策サレタモノデ

アル。實際本協定ヲ受理セザル場合英國市切ニ於ケル印度ヘノ損失ノ脅威ヨリ他國カラノ印度ニ對スル原料ノ需要ノ減少ニ於テ恐ラク蒙ルデアラウ印度ノ損失ノ方ガヨリ大デアルデアラウ。本協定ヲ全体トシテ判断スレバ我ガ委員會ハ何等躊躇スル事ナク、ソレハ印度農民ノ利益デモナク又印度實業家ノ利益デモナク又印度製造業者ノ利益デモナク又一般ノ納稅者ノ利益デモナイトヲ明言スルモノデアル。

ソレハ英國製造業者、英國輸出業者、英國海運業者ノ利益ニナルノミデアル。實際英國政府ノ貿易局長官ハ下院ニ於テソレハ「我ガ國ノ印度向輸出商社ノ活動力ノ甚大ナル增加竝ニ英聯合王國ニ於ケル製造業中心地ニ於ケル之ニ照應シタ影響」ヲ意味スルデアラウト聲明シタ。

理 事

敬 具

デ エ イ 。 ケ イ 。 メ ー タ